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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON





Many puzzle-loving lawyers have been drawn into the intrica-
cies of the law of burdens of proof, presumptions and inferences.
Even though this area of the law determines the outcome of com-
paratively few disputes, these topics are extraordinarily interesting
because they are vehicles for discussing two issues basic to the jus-
tice system. The first is how decision-making power should be di-
vided between the judge and the jury. The second is who should
lose if some disputed fact is not clear.
Allocations of the burdens of proof and presumptions have
been challenged under the federal Constitution since the nineteenth
century.1 Although some of the cases were civil, the majority, espe-
cially since the mid-1960s, have been criminal. These cases do not
address directly the two issues described above, but they deal with
related questions. Sometimes the Supreme Court and scholars have
used presumption cases to discuss the nature of legislative, as op-
posed to judicial, authority to determine how a trial should be con-
ducted. In particular, statutory presumptions have been challenged
as usurping the trial judge's authority to determine when a party
has presented sufficient evidence to get to the jury. The Court and
the commentators have also used cases regarding the weight and
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law. J.D., University
of New Mexico School of law, 1976; B.A., New Mexico State University, 1973. Thanks
to a number of research assistants over the years, especially Peter Sorensen, Margaret
Smith, and Anne Wyatt. Thanks also for reading and commenting on prior drafts to my
colleagues Caroline Forell, Laird Kirkpatrick, Gretchen Miller, Jim O'Fallon, and Chuck
O'Kelley.
I Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36 (1896); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698 (1893); Marx v. Hanthorn, 148 U.S. 172 (1893).
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allocation of the burdens of proof and presumptions to discuss in-
directly limits on substantive law, particularly criminal law.
The purely evidentiary aspects of the law of burdens of proof
and presumptions is complicated enough; when the constitutional
complexities are added, confusion often follows. Efforts to under-
stand how courts have handled the constitutional issues solely in
terms of doctrine or the relationships between the legislature,
judges and juries are frustrating and unsatisfactory. The cases and
commentary about constitutional limits on presumptions are best
understood as expressions of, and factors in, the creation of the
changing concept of what due process is all about. The purposes of
this article are to sketch the relationship between the limits on pre-
sumptions and the meaning of due process over the twentieth cen-
tury and within this framework to analyze a half dozen cases decided
by the Supreme Court since 1975. These cases significantly reform
the constitutional limits on the allocation of the burdens of proof,
presumptions and inferences in criminal cases.
First this article uses evidence law concepts to provide a back-
ground for the constitutional discussion that follows. It defines
terms and describes the relationship of presumptions and inferences
to the burdens of proof and how courts and legislatures have tradi-
tionally used these devices to reshape the substantive law and alter
the distribution of power between the judge and jury.
The next section traces the development of the constitutional
law of presumptions and of burdens of proof through the early
1970s. The third section concludes that the most recent Supreme
Court cases about presumptions, decided in the late 1970s and early
1980s, mean that in criminal cases legislatures may no longer enact
statutory presumptions to satisfy or reallocate the burden of pro-
duction or persuasion. The only effect that a statute which purports
to create a presumption may have is to call attention to an inference
that might be drawn from evidence. The cases have, however, left
largely intact legislative authority to determine what factors are rele-
vant to criminal liability and which party shall bear the burdens of
proof on each factor.
Since the late 1960s the cases and commentators have based
discussions of burdens of proof and presumptions on how they af-
fect the trial's fact-finding function and the requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases. The final section of
this article argues that the changes in the law that have resulted
from this emphasis will have little effect on the resolution of the vast
majority of criminal cases. The importance of these changes lies in
their contribution to the prevailing vision of the meaning of due
1986] 309
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process. Recent cases are part of a larger pattern of efforts to pro-
vide assurance that the criminal justice system is good at convicting
only factually guilty people. While protecting innocent people from
conviction has always been important, this goal is now particularly
emphasized because of the increasingly harsh manner in which per-
sons accused and convicted of crime are treated by the criminal jus-
tice system.2 The discussions of the technical details of burdens of
proof, presumptions and inferences are addressed to lawyers them-
selves and are designed to help convince them that most convicted
persons are treated fairly and are in fact guilty.
I. BURDENS OF PROOF AND EVIDENTIARY DEVICES
THAT AFFECT THEM
Two very basic issues are often discussed under the rubric of
who should bear the burdens of production and persuasion and
whether the burdens have been satisfied. The first is how decision-
making power should be distributed between the judge and the jury,
and the second is what the content of the underlying substantive law
should be. Understanding the changing constitutional law of pre-
sumptions requires understanding how the two burdens of proof
work and how two evidentiary devices, presumptions and infer-
ences, may affect them.
The party who bears the burden of production must produce
enough evidence to satisfy that burden to get to the jury. If the
evidence is insufficient, the judge will direct a verdict against that
party.3 The party who bears the burden of persuasion will lose the
case if the factfinder is not convinced of the correctness of that
party's assertions. 4
A presumption is a rule of law requiring that once some fact (a
"basic" or "proven" fact) is established, some other fact at issue
(the "presumed" fact) must be deemed true, at least provisionally. 5
In contrast, an inference is not a rule of law but rather is just a con-
clusion that may or may not be drawn that some fact is probably
true. Whether such a conclusion is warranted depends on the per-
suasiveness of the evidence. Presumptions may be logical infer-
ences that have hardened into law, or they may call for conclusions
that are only plausible or even illogical, based on the evidence
presented. Courts and legislatures create the latter kind of pre-
2 See ihfra text accompanying notes 222-31.
3 C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 336 at 947 (3d ed. 1984).
4 4J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2487 at 3526 (1905).
5 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 342 at 965.
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sumptions expressly for the sake of manipulating one of the burdens
of proof.
The remainder of this part will explain how presumptions and
inferences may affect the burdens of proof and consequently, either
the distribution of decision-making power between judge and jury
or the content of the underlying substantive law.
A. EFFECT ON THE RELATIVE POWER OF JUDGE AND JURY
A presumption can expressly alter the allocation of decision-
making power between the judge and jury. Rules that define
whether and how the judge may tell the jury about presumptions
and inferences also affect this balance of power.
The authority to resolve factual disputes is divided between the
judge and jury initially by the substantive law, which determines
who bears the burden of production on each issue. The judge de-
cides whether a party has satisfied this burden. Once this burden is
satisfied, the power to resolve the factual dispute moves to the jury.
As a part of determining whether the burden has been satisfied, the
judge draws inferences from the evidence.
In contrast, of its own force a presumption at least satisfies the
burden of production of the party in whose favor it runs. Thejudge
has no authority to withhold a case from the jury on the grounds
that there is insufficient evidence to support the presumed fact. Or-
dinarily a presumption additionally shifts the burden of production
to the opposing party. If so, the judge is obligated to direct a ver-
dict in favor of the party benefitted by the presumption unless the
opposing party produces enough evidence to rebut the presump-
tion. 6 In some jurisdictions a presumption may also shift the bur-
den of persuasion to the opponent of the party in whose favor it
runs. Since a shift of the burden of persuasion necessarily involves a
shift of the burden of production, such a presumption also alters the
relative roles of judge and jury.
Whether and how the judge tells the jury about presumptions
and inferences also affects the relative decision-making power of
judge andjury. In the early nineteenth century the jury in a criminal
case was commonly permitted to determine questions of law as well
6 An inference alone does not formally shift the burden of production, but as a prac-
tical matter instructions about inferences do alter the relative burdens of the parties.
For a discussion of the effects ofjury instructions, see infra text accompanying notes 7-
10. See also Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: A Unified Constitutional
Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARV. L. REV. 321, 326-39 (1980)(discussion of the
prosecution and defense's relative burdens of persuasion and the effect ofjudicial com-
ments, presumptions and inferences on them).
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as fact. 7 This gave way to the present-day rule that judges deter-
mine the law and instruct the jury on it, with the accompanying for-
mal expectation that the jury will follow the judge's instructions.8
Juries are always instructed on the allocation and weight of the
burden of persuasion, which means that juries are routinely in-
structed on presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion. Ordi-
narily the jury is not told about allocation of the burden of
production, since the judge would not have sent the case to the jury
if it had not been satisfied. Jurors may, however, hear about a pre-
sumption that only shifts the burden of production if the basic fact
on which the presumption depends is itself in dispute.9
In some jurisdictions the judge may also instruct the jury on the
inferences it is permitted to draw. Some such instructions, like pre-
sumption instructions, are abstract and standardized. Others are ad
hoc and tailored to the particular facts, in which case they are a form
of comment on the evidence. Neither purports to bind the jury, but
both are intended to, and probably do, make it more likely that the
jury will draw the suggested conclusion, as instructions about pre-
sumptions also do. 10
Since the late 1800s the way that the judge instructs the jury
has changed, moving from commentary in layperson's language tai-
lored to the facts of the case to the current standardized, abstract,
dry and boring instructions.' I This development has tended to min-
7 See Howe,Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REv. 582 (1939); Morano, A
Reexamination of the Development of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 B.U.L. REV. 507, 524-25
(1975). Until 1835 judges in federal courts told jurors that they were the judges of law
and fact in criminal cases, not bound by the court's opinion. Howe, supra at 589. See also
1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 107[01] (1986).
8 See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895), in which the Supreme Court for the
first time clearly concluded that in federal court, the criminal jury is obligated to follow
the judge's directions on matters of law.
9 For discussions of the wording of jury instructions about presumptions and bur-
dens of proof see Morgan, Techniques in the Use of Presumptions, 24 IowA L. REV. 413
(1939) [hereinafter Morgan, Use of Presumptions]; Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presump-
tions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARV. L. REV. 59 (1933)[hereinafter Morgan, Instructing the
Jury].
10 Recent empirical studies suggest thatjuries may not understand many instructions
because of how they are phrased, their abstraction and their use of jargon. See, e.g.,
Charrow & Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study ofJuDy
Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306 (1979); Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability of
Jurors to Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 153 (1982).
See alsoJ. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 181 (1930). Because empirical research on
juries while they are actually functioning is prohibited, the correspondence of these
studies with reality can always be questioned, but information about how juries actually
work is unobtainable. This feature make debates about the effect ofjury instructions a
particularly attractive device for discussing indirectly other issues.
I I L. FRIEDMAN & R. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
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imize the amount of control the judge has over the jury. 12 In the
federal courts and in some states judges retain the power to make
comments tailored to the facts of the case,' 3 but this power is rarely
used. 14
B. EFFECT ON THE UNDERLYING SUBSTANTIVE LAW
A presumption that shifts either the burden of production or
persuasion on some element of a party's case redefines the parties'
cases, at least provisionally or conditionally.' 5 For example, assume
that illegal importation is an element of the government's case and
that illegal importation is rebuttably presumed from proof of the
defendant's possession. 16 When the prosecutor proves possession,
illegal importation is deleted from the government's case, and legal
importation becomes something for the defendant to prove.' 7
When, if ever, the obligation to prove the importation's illegality
will shift back to the prosecution depends on whether the presump-
ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 1870-1910 186-93 (1981). Commentators have argued
that the elimination of the judge's power to comment on the evidence was a powerful
incentive for extending the use of presumptions. See, e.g., Reaugh, Presumptions and the
Burden of Proof, 36 ILL. L. REV. 703, 719 n.103 (1942).
12 The desire to limit the judge's power is explicit in the no comment on the evidence
cases. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 7, at 107[01]. McCormick said that in-
structions on presumptions complied with the no comment on the evidence rule because
they were abstract and general and therefore were free of any suggestion that the judge
was giving his own opinion. However, he also acknowledged the difficulty of determin-
ing when an inference changes from being permissible, and thus a comment, to a pre-
sumption, and thus a rule of law. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
665-68 (1954). A second reason for abstract, standardized statements to thejury is that
jury instructions are a ripe ground for appellate review, though in times of few criminal
appeals this may be only of marginal importance. L. FRIEDMAN & R. PERCIVAL, supra
note 11, at 188.
13 See I J. WEINSTIN & M. BERGER, supra note 7, at 107[01], n.15.
14 Id. at 107[01].
15 Over the years a number of authors have observed that judges use presumptions
to change the substantive law. See, e.g., Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay onjuristic
Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 24 (1959); Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363,
(1930); Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5 VAND. L. REV. 324, 339 (1952);
Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REV. 906, 909 (1930)[here-
inafter Morgan, Observations Concerning Presumptions]. See also Ashford & Risinger, Pre-
sumptions, Assumptions and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE LJ.
165, 169 (1969).
16 See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S.
6 (1969). The Court did not construe the presumption as shifting the burden of persua-
sion to the defendant in either Leary or Turner. See Turner, 396 U.S. at 405-06, 420-23;
Leary, 395 U.S. at 37.
17 In Turner, the Court acknowledged that from the defendant's point of view the
presumption turned the crime into possession, but denied that it redefined the crime.
Turner, 396 U.S. at 405-09. See also United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1979) (rejecting




tion merely shifts the burden of production or also the burden of
persuasion.' 8 If only the production burden is shifted, as soon as
the defendant produces some evidence of legality the obligation re-
turns to the prosecutor. If the burden of persuasion is shifted, it will
not return to the prosecutor. Sometimes presumptions have more
complex results. If the fact on which the presumption rests, in this
example possession, is itself an element of the government's case,' 9
the presumption has the effect just described. If possession were
not an element, however, the government's case would be redefined
so that, at least initially, it could choose to prove either illegal im-
portation or possession.20
Neither comments on the evidence nor instructed inferences al-
ter the substantive law. Indeed, as part III infra discusses, statutory
presumptions are today sometimes treated as inferences to avoid
the constitutional problems that arise if a presumption shifts the
burden of persuasion. Until the late 1960s, however, inferences and
comments on the evidence were considered to be only tangentially
related to presumptions because they are not rules of law, and both
scholars and the courts were concerned with presumptions as law. 21
Often it is not clear whether a presumption's creator intended it
to satisfy the burden of production only, to shift and satisfy it, or
further to shift the burden of persuasion. Most of the scholarly liter-
ature about presumptions in the twentieth century has been devoted
to this question. 22 Interpretation of a presumption is a matter of
18 A presumption that shifts the burden of persuasion to a criminal defendant on an
element of the prosecution's case today is considered unconstitutional. See infra text
accompanying notes 104-16. Whether a presumption can shift the burden of produc-
tion on an element of the crime to the defendant is debatable; at the very least, failure to
satisfy such a burden cannot result in a directed verdict against the defendant. See infra
text accompanying notes 152-54.
19 See Turner, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); Leafy, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Tot v. United States, 319
U.S. 463 (1943).
20 See, e.g., Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979). For a discussion of
Ulster Court County see infra text accompanying notes 120-30. The presumption of pos-
session from presence in a car containing a gun effectively meant that the prosecutor
could prove in its case-in-chief either possession of a gun or presence in a car that con-
tained a gun. If it chose the latter route, the defendant could escape liability by showing
that he did not possess the gun. See infra note 117.
21 For this reason, until the recent changes in how presumptions are understood, it
would not have made sense to question whether a presumption improperly invaded the
domain of the jury. This issue was raised under the rubric ofjudicial comments on the
evidence. McCormick, What Shall the Trial Judge Tell the Jury About Presumptions, 13 WASH.
L. REV. 185, 187-88 (1938); Morgan, Instructing the Jury, supra note 9, at 68. Thoughjury
instructions about presumptions and comments on the evidence are related, instructions
were ancillary to the basic law of presumptions and comparatively unimportant. Id.
22 In essence, this is the great Thayer-Morgan debate, with all its ancillary issues, that
occupied evidence scholars from the 1930s until well into the 1960s. Representative of
[Vol. 77314
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local law not determined by the federal Constitution. The Constitu-
tion's due process clauses may, however, invalidate presumptions in
certain situations, as the next section will discuss.
II. THE CHANGING DUE PROCESS TEST FOR PRESUMPTIONS
The test for the constitutional validity of presumptions is an ex-
pression of, and therefore has varied with, the Supreme Court's
changing conception of the meaning of due process, "fundamental
fairness."
Understanding the development of the constitutional law of
presumptions is difficult because the cases and commentators often
take fundamentally different approaches without making their per-
spectives clear and without acknowledging the different perspectives
of their predecessors. This problem manifests itself in discussions
of three basic questions.
The first involves the identity of what underlying issue is in dis-
pute. There are two different groups of cases, each assuming that a
different issue is key. In one group of cases, always involving statu-
tory presumptions, a party claims that by enacting a presumption
which satisfies or shifts a burden of proof the legislature has ex-
ceeded its authority to determine when evidence is sufficient to
prove some fact.23 In the other line of cases, which may concern
statutory or common law presumptions, the issue is the fairness of
this debate are the following: Morgan, Observations Concerning Presumptions, supra note 15;
Morgan, Use of Presumptions, supra note 9; Morgan, Instructing the Jury, supra note 9; Mor-
gan & McGuire, Loding Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1937);
McBaine, Presumptions: Are They Evidence?, 26 CALIF. L. REV. 519 (1938); Falknor, Notes on
Presumptions, 15 WASH. L. REV. 71 (1940); Reaugh, supra note 11; Morgan, Further Obser-
vations on Presumptions, 16 S. CAL. L. REV. 245 (1943) [hereinafter, Morgan, Further Obser-
vations on Presumptions]; Gausewitz, supra note 15; Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory
of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L. REV. 195 (1953); McNaughton, Burden of Production Evidence:
A Function of Burden of Persuasion, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1382 (1955); Stumbo, Presumptions-A
View of Chaos, 3 WASHBURN L.J. 182 (1964). The debate continues today. See Broun, The
Unfulfillable Promise of One Rule for All Presumptions, 62 N.C.L. REV. 697 (1984).
23 Statutory criminal presumptions have been enacted in waves throughout the cen-
tury as aids to the prosecutor. Brosman, The Statutory Presumption, 5 TUL. L. REV. 17
(1930); Chamberlain, Presumptions as First Aid to the District Attorney, 14 A.B.A.J. 287
(1928)(especially important where prosecution must prove defendant's state of mind);
O'Toole, Artificial Presumptions in the Criminal Law, 11 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 167 (1937)(also
concerns statute similar to the one construed in Ulster County Court); Note, Statutory Pre-
sumptions as Devices to Facilitate the Proof of Crimes, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1928)(includes
discussion of statute very similar to the one construed in Ulster County Court, which the
author approved because it was aimed at a dangerous class of persons so that the benefit
justified the slight imposition on the innocent); Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutoy
Criminal Presumptions, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 141 (1966); Note, Statutory Criminal Presumptions:
Judicial Sleight of Hand, 53 VA. L. REV. 702 (1967).
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allocating a burden of proof to the defendant. 24 The two groups of
cases have not developed as separate, distinct lines; instead, the
Supreme Court has moved from one issue to the other, often with-
out making the shift clear.
The second question is what justifies the creation of a presump-
tion, either statutory or common law. Through the years evidence
scholars have argued that presumptions may be created for reasons
unrelated to the factual likelihood that the presumed fact follows
from the proven fact.25 However, the first due process challenges to
presumptions assumed that they purported to be logical inferences.
In the early part of the century alternate interpretations of why pre-
sumptions are created appeared in the due process cases, but the
presumption-as-standardized-inference interpretation has dominat-
ed since the 1940s.
The third question is whether the Constitution requires a differ-
ent treatment of presumptions in criminal cases and, if it does, why.
For the first several years of this century courts and commentators
usually did not see the problem of imperfect fact-finding as signifi-
cantly different in civil and criminal cases. 26 By the 1930s they drew
24 Other unsuccessful constitutional challenges to presumptions have also been
made. See, e.g., United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1964)(trial by jury, privilege
against self-incrimination); Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925)(privilege
against self-incrimination); Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904)(right to jury trial
and prohibition of bills of attainder). See generally Brosman, The Statutory Presumption (II),
5 TUL. L. REV. 178 (1930)(courts have rejected challenges based on right to jury trial,
equal protection clause, presumption of innocence and privilege against self-incrimina-
tion).
Attacks on conclusive presumptions have usually succeeded because they deny a
party a right to a hearing. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S 89 (1965); Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S.
312 (1932). See also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); United States v. United
States Gympsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246
(1952). This is so even though many commentators have said that conclusive presump-
tions are really substantive rules in disguise and should be analyzed as such. C. MCCoR-
MICK, supra note 12, at 640 n.2; MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 3, at 804; J.
THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 539 (1898); 4 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 4, at 2492; 9 WIGMORE'S EVIDENCE § 2492 at 307 (Chadbourn rev.
1981); Brosman, supra note 23, at 18, 40; Keeton, Statutory Presumptions-Their Constitu-
tionality and Legal Effect, 10 TEx. L. REV. 34 (1931); Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L.
REV. 255 (1937)[hereinafter Morgan, Presumptions]. Disposing of the cases on the basis
of this evidentiary question sometimes permits the Court to avoid sticky substantive is-
sues. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (custodial rights of unwed father); Car-
rington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (limits on right to vote). In Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976), however, the Court rebuffed a challenge to a conclusive
presumption, saying that it was really a disguised substantive rule.
25 For typical listings see MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 3, at 968-73; Morgan,
Presumptions, supra note 24, at 257-59.
26 Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices
in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 888 (1968). See also Hoberg, The Burden of Proof Ih'liere
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a definite distinction, and since then assumptions about the mini-
mum conditions for a fair criminal trial have changed. Until fairly
recently, the main consideration in allocating burdens of proof was
enhancing the capacity of the trial to find historical truth; a pre-
sumption that shifted the burden of persuasion on some issues,
even to a criminal defendant, was permitted if more factually accu-
rate verdicts were likely. Until quite recently both the prosecution's
obligation to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the prohi-
bition of directed verdicts against criminal defendants were ac-
cepted;27 they were not, however, understood as being necessarily
related.28 Further, requiring the defendant to prove defenses that
are today interpreted as negating elements of the crime 29 was until
fairly recently considered consistent with the prosecution's burden
of proof.
The two periods of the greatest number of Supreme Court pre-
sumption cases and the greatest amount of constitutional change
were the late 1920s to early 1930s and the mid-1960s through the
late 1970s, both time periods during which the criminal justice sys-
tem generally was subject to increased constitutional scrutiny. The
next two subsections discuss developments before 1965 and from
1965 to 1974. The third section describes and analyzes changes
from the mid-1970s to the present.
A. 1900 TO THE MID-1960S
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, when to-
day's conception of what the burdens of proof are and how pre-
Mental Incapacity is Pleaded, 44 AM. L. REV. 538 (1910)(treating criminal law insanity de-
fense and will contest for lack of testamentary capacity as raising similar issues).
27 As late as 1876, however, ajudge could respectably express doubt that the prose-
cution's burden of persuasions in criminal cases should be higher than that of the plain-
tiff in civil cases. Note, Some Rules of Evidence: Reasonable Doubt in Civil and Criminal Cases,
10 AM. L. REV. 642 (1876). For a history of the proof beyond a reasonable doubt re-
quirement see Morano, supra note 7.
28 4J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, at 2541. See also 9J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 2511 (1940).
Wigmore argued that if a presumption created a duty for the defendant to produce evi-
dence and he did not, the jury could be required to find in accordance with the pre-
sumption. 4J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, at 3559-60 (1905).
29 Id. at 3559-60 (1905). See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at 662; 9J. WIGMORE,
supra note 28, at 2511. Articles in the early twentieth century argued as a matter of logic
or policy that the prosecution in criminal cases should have the burden of persuasion for
certain defensive matters but did not consider this to be constitutionally required. See,
e.g., Note, Burden of Proof in the Defense ofInsanity, 6 VA. L. REV. 209 (1919). The Model
Penal Code was the first complete formulation of the concept that several of the major
defenses negate the means rea of the element of the crime to which they pertain. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 commentary at 123, 127 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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sumptions relate to them was just beginning to be accepted, 30 only a
few presumption cases went to the Supreme Court. At a time when
the nature of due process limits on legislation in general was a ma-
jor issue, the first important presumption case involved a statute ap-
plicable to personal injury suits against railroads. In 1910 in Mobile,
Jackson and Kansas City Railroad v. Turnipseed3' the Supreme Court
held that due process permitted the legislature to enact presump-
tions affecting the process of proof if there was a "rational connec-
tion" between the proven and presumed facts, though it did not
explain what this meant. The Court also said that a presumption
could not deprive a party of a reasonable opportunity to submit to
the jury all the facts bearing upon an issue. 32 Turnipseed was a civil
case, but nothing suggested that criminal cases would be treated dif-
ferently; in dicta, the Court said that the test applied to both.33
The 1920s were marked by growing concern over the rise of
organized crime and the perceived ineffectiveness of the criminal
justice system to protect society.3 4 As applied to criminal statutes
containing presumptions, the rational connection test was criticized
for limiting too drastically legislative attempts to help prosecutors,3 5
even though the test as applied was not very stringent.36 Some com-
30 It was not until the late nineteenth century that Thayer introduced what has be-
come the standard understanding of the two burdens of production and how presump-
tions may affect them. J. THAYER, supra, note 24, at chs. 8-9; Thayer, Presumptions and the
Law of Evidence, 3 HARV. L. REV. 141 (1889).
31 219 U.S. 35 (1910). The Court followed Thayer, making a distinction between the
burdens of production and persuasion and treating the instant presumption as shifting
the burden of production. In Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), the Court held
that so long as a statutory presumption required the prosecution to prove enough to
make it reasonable to require the defendant to explain himself, and so long as the de-
fendant did in fact have a chance to explain himself, the presumption was constitutional.
Though Turnipseed is generally cited as the first articulation of the rational connection
test, its source is clearly visible in Adams. See Adams, 192 U.S. at 599.
32 Turnipseed, 219 U.S. at 43. This meant at least that the presumption could not be
conclusive. Over the next twelve years, the Court treated inconsistently presumptions
that, together with rules that prohibited testimony from parties, effectively precluded a
defendant from rebutting a presumption. Compare Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219
(1911) with Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S. 1 (1922).
33 Turnipseed, 219 U.S. at 43. Early criminal cases using the rational connection test
included: Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413 (1928); Yee Hem v. United States, 268
U.S. 178 (1925); Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S. 1; Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585.
34 For more extensive discussions see C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE ch. 8 (1978); Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26-
33; Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a Third "Model" of the Criminal Process, 79 YALE
LJ. 350, 391-93 (1970); Mather, Comments on the History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 281 (1979).
35 Chamberlin, supra note 23, at 288; Note, Statutory Presumptions as Devices to Facilitate
the Proof of Crimes, supra note 23, at 494. See also Note, The Constitutionality of StatutoOy
Presumptions, 8 N.C.L. REV. 50 (1929).
"3(5 During the 1920s, for example, the Court upheld presumptions that (1) a person
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mentators even challenged the claim that the due process clause
should be interpreted as requiring legislation to be rational.3 7
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes proposed an alternative to the
rational connection test, now known as the greater includes the
lesser test.3 8 From his perspective the basic issue that presumptions
raise is the extent of legislative authority over the process of proof.
Justice Holmes and other proponents of this test argued that if the
legislature could constitutionally impose liability on proof of the ba-
sic fact alone, it could have made the presumed fact irrelevant.
Therefore, if liability on the basic fact were constitutional, the pre-
sumption was also necessarily constitutional. For example, in the
1928 case of Ferry v. Ramsey 3 9 a statute provided that if a bank officer
accepted a deposit knowing the bank was insolvent, he was person-
ally liable for the deposit. The statute also said that upon proof that
the bank was insolvent at the time the deposit was received, the bank
officer's knowledge of the insolvency and assent to the deposit were
presumed. In Ferry, Holmes assumed that the legislature could
make bank officers responsible for deposits whenever the bank ac-
cepted them, regardless of their knowledge of the bank's insolvency.
From this he argued that if the legislature chose to impose liability
only on officers who knew of the insolvency, it could also provide
that this knowledge was presumed on proof of another fact, here,
the bank's insolvency at the time of the deposit.
A majority of the Court accepted this mode of analysis only
once, in Ferry.40 In the same year in a criminal case 41 the Court used
the rational connection test, and the next year the Court returned to
on whose property a liquor distilling apparatus is found knows of its presence, Hawes,
258 U.S. 1; (2) that opium was illegally imported after 1909 and the defendant knew this
from proof of possession, Yee Hem, 268 U.S. 178; and (3) a defendant who possessed
drugs purchased them from an unstamped package, Casey, 276 U.S. 413.
37 J. Wigmore on Evidence § 1356, 1063 (2d ed. 1923). See also Keeton, supra note
24, at 45-46.
38 Holmes advocated this type of analysis across a wide spectrum of issues. See Al-
schuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 652, 699 (1981); Rogat,
Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN. L. REv. 3, 14-18, 281-82, 300 (1962).
39 277 U.S. 88 (1928).
40 In several cases, including Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 239 (1911), and Case., 276
U.S. at 418, Holmes argued for the greater includes the lesser test. In Bailey, a majority
of the Court held a presumption unconstitutional, in part because the subject matter to
which it pertained was within the scope of the thirteenth amendment prohibition of slav-
ery. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 239-44. The Court said that the legislature could no more vio-
late a constitutional provision indirectly by use of a presumption than it could by direct
enactment. Id. at 244. This is something like a greater includes the lesser test: if the
legislature cannot do whatever would be involved in enacting the basic thing, it cannot
create the presumption. This analysis resurfaces periodically, even though the test more
conventionally called the greater includes the lesser has been repudiated.
41 Case, 276 U.S. 413.
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the rational connection test in two civil cases without even mention-
ing Feny.42 Despite its logical appeal, the greater includes the lesser
test has two major flaws. It denies that fair process is independently
important, and it forces questions regarding the constitutionality of
the underlying substantive law, which courts often wish to avoid,
such as Feny's focus on legislative authority to impose strict liability.
In the late 1920s commentators generally favored the Ferry
analysis. They routinely criticized the application of the rational
connection test to criminal presumptions as providing inadequate
protection to the public. These commentators argued that if a pre-
sumption satisfied either the rational connection or the greater in-
cludes the lesser test it should be valid. 43 Some even said that
directed verdicts against criminal defendants should be permitted.44
In a 1934 criminal case the Court adopted a third due process
test for presumptions which reflected this emphasis on the struggle
between criminals and society, expressly suggesting that due pro-
cess imposes more stringent limits on presumptions in criminal than
in civil cases. In Morrison v. California,45 the Court no longer defined
the basic issue as the nature of the limits on legislation that shapes
the trial process. Instead, the key question was in what circum-
stances the state could fairly allocate a burden of proof to the
defendant.
The Court was influenced by Wigmore, who believed that a
presumption could legitimately be created even if it did not express
42 Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929); Western & Atlantic Railroad Co. v. Hender-
son, 279 U.S. 639 (1929). Manley involved a statute quite similar to the one considered
in Feny. Compare Manl-y, 279 U.S. at 3-4 with Ferry, 277 U.S. at 93.
In Henderson, the Court used the rational connection test to invalidate a statutory
presumption very similar to the one that it upheld in Turnipseed only nineteen years ear-
lier. Henderson, 279 U.S. at 640. Turnipseed is discussed supra text accompanying notes
31-33. The Court distinguished Turnipseed on the basis that the presumption there only
shifted the burden of production while the presumption in Henderson shifted the burden
of persuasion. Henderson, 279 U.S. at 644. Whether a presumption shifted both burdens
or only the burden of persuasion was a question of state law. Id. Henderson did not
discuss why this meant that the rationality link had to be stronger or how much stronger
it had to be. Id.
Whether shifting burdens of production or burdens of persuasion is more impor-
tant and more onerous was debated. In Turnipseed and Henderson, the Court treated the
burden of persuasion as literally weighing more, so that more evidence was necessary to
satisfy it than the burden of production. See Henderson, 279 U.S. at 644.
43 Keeton, supra note 24, at 42-50; Morgan, Federal Constitutional Limitations Upon Pre-
sumptions Created by State Legislation, in HARVARD I.CGAL EssAYs 323 (1934); Comment,
Presumptions-Constuittional Validity of Statute Establishing Proof of Reputation as Prima Facie
Evidence of Commission of Crime, 30 MICH. L. REV. 600 (1932); Note, The Coustitutionality of
Statutory Presumnptions, supra note 35, at 55.
44 Morgan, supra note 43, at 333.
45 291 U.S. 82 (1934).
320 [Vol. 77
LIMITS ON CRIMINAL PRESUMPTIONS
a logical relationship between the presumed and proven facts.46 He
saw presumptions as a device for allocating rather than satisfying
burdens of proof.47 Consistent with this, the Morrison Court held
that a presumption was constitutional either if it satisfied the ra-
tional connection test or if there were "a manifest disparity in op-
portunity for access to evidence and shifting the burden would not
subject the accused to hardship or oppression." 48
The Court rejected Ferry and its implication that process did not
matter.49 Instead, it linked the constitutionality of a presumption to
the trial's fact-finding function-if an innocent defendant might not
be able to rebut the presumption it would fail, but neither was con-
viction of the guilty to be made too difficult. From today's perspec-
tive the manifest disparity of opportunity test seems prosecution-
oriented, but in its social and legal context it was reasonably liberal.
Morrison's concern for the innocent defendant reflected changes
in the social climate and in how the criminal justice system was per-
ceived. The country was deep in the Depression, and totalitarian
regimes were rising in Europe. 50 Only two years before Morrison, in
Powell v. Alabama,5 1 the Court for the first time held that trying a
46 Id. at 88-89 (citing 5J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 2486, 2512 (2d ed. 1923)).
47 In several of the early cases, including Morrison, whether the presumption shifted
the burden of persuasion as well as the burden of production is not entirely clear. What
it means to shift a burden of production to a criminal defendant, given that verdicts
cannot be directed against the defense, is still a puzzle. See infra text accompanying
notes 152-54.
48 Morrison, 291 U.S. at 88-89. The defendant was prosecuted for conspiracy to put
into possession of land an alien ineligible for citizenship. A statute provided that alien-
age and ineligibility for citizenship were presumed upon proof of possession. Id. at 84.
The Court held the presumption unconstitutional. It found that the proven facts did not
have a "sinister significance" and that the defendant did not have manifestly greater
access to proof. Id. at 90-96. "The probability [was] ... thus apparent that the transfer
of the burden [might] ... result in grave injustice in the only class of cases in which it
[would] ... be of any practical importance." Id. at 96.
Later recountings of the test, both by the Court and by commentators, treated these
as two factors of one test. Some emphasized the rational connection aspect. See Tot v.
United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). For a discussion of Tot, see infra text accompanying
notes 56-60. See also Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, supra note 22; Note, Tot
v. United States: Constitutional Restrictions on Statutory Presumptions, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1324,
1327 (1943). Others emphasized the disparity of access to evidence. See, e.g., Hale, Evi-
dence-Constitutional Law-Necessity of Logical Inference to Support a Presumption, 17 S. CAL. L.
REV. 48 (1943); Note, Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Judicial Sleight of Hand, supra note 23;
But see Note, Constitutionality of Rebuttable Statutory Presumptions, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 527
(1955)(courts continue to treat comparative convenience as an alternative to rational
connection).
49 Morrison, 291 U.S. at 94.
50 Allen, The Judicial Quest for PenalJustice: The 1'arren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975
U. ILL. L.F. 518, 521-23.
51 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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defendant without counsel could violate due process. Two years af-
ter Morrison, in Brown v. Mississippi,52 the Court first held that the use
of a coerced confession violates the fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess clause. Law review articles began to express concern about the
eagerness of legislators to help prosecutors in criminal cases, argu-
ing in particular that presumptions should not be made to bear the
entire weight of fighting organized crime and unscrupulous defense
tactics.53
Over the next decade the Court, along with much of the rest of
government, struggled with the tension between individual rights
and the claims of the community. 54 The debate over incorporation
of the Bill of Rights into the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment began in earnest.5 5 In the midst of World War II, the
Court again turned to the constitutional limits on legislative pre-
sumptions. Tot v. United States5 6 reaffirmed that due process re-
quires that there be a rational connection between the proven and
presumed facts. It characterized Morrison's manifest disparity of op-
portunity test as a mere corollary rather than an independent test of
validity. 57
Commentators criticized the Court for holding the presump-
52 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
53 E.g., O'Toole, supra note 23. The article concerned the constitutionality of a New
York statutory presumption virtually identical to the one at issue in Ulster County Court
v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979). See O'Toole, supra note 23, at 169. The author concluded
that a presumption that changed the burden of proof, modified the presumption of in-
nocence, and removed the privilege against self-incrimination was not unreasonable and
therefore not uncontitutional. Id. at 170-71.
54 See G. FETNER, ORDERED LIBERTY: LEGAL REFORM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 69-
75 (1983). The major constitutional struggle of the period was over the Court's author-
ity to judge the substantive validity of New Deal legislation. See United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941); National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
Justice William 0. Douglas put Tot into this framework, characterizing it as a vestige of
hard judicial scrutiny of legislation. W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1937-1975: THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 52 (1980).
55 See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 (1937). Even though the defendant's claims were often rejected in these early years,
the critical step of considering the possibility that specific provisions of the Bill of Rights
might limit the states had been taken. Compare P. ROSE, PARALLEL LIVES 37, 41 (1983).
Other cases of the era also reflect increasing sensitivity to unfairness in the criminal
system. See Ashcraft v. Tennesee, 332 U.S. 143 (1944); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S.
596 (1944); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547
(1942); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103
(1935); Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933).
56 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
5-7 319 U.S. at 469.
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tion in Tot, which they said reallocated the burden of proof, to a
standard appropriate only for presumptions that merely prescribed
when circumstantial evidence satisfied a burden.58 The Court was,
however, well aware that the issue was limits on legislative authority
to allocate burdens of proof; it rejected the Morrison test precisely
because it could be interpreted to uphold a presumption which cast
a burden onto a criminal defendant when the government had not
sufficiently proven its case.59 Tot was the first presumption case in
which the Court clearly said that sometimes the Constitution re-
quires the prosecution to bear the burden of proof on issues that the
defendant is better able to prove, even though the prosecution may
have great difficulty proving them.60
During the 1950s, interest in the substantive criminal law in-
creased, spurred by the promulgation of the Model Penal Code.6 1
The Supreme Court did not deal directly with constitutional limits
on substantive law, though its treatment of procedural questions,
including presumptions, often seemed colored by this question. For
58 Hale, supra note 48; Note, Tot v. United States: Constitutional Restrictions on Statutory
Presumptions, supra note 48.
59 Tot, 319 U.S. at 469. The opinion also firmly rejected the greater includes the
lesser test. Id. at 472.
60 The Court stated,
Nor can the fact that the defendant has the better means of information, standing
alone,justify the creation of such a presumption. In every criminal case the defend-
ant has at least an equal familiarity with the factors and in most a greater familiarity
with them than the prosecution. It might, therefore, be argued that to place upon
all defendants in criminal cases the burden of going forward with the evidence
would be proper. But the argument proves too much. If it were sound, the legisla-
ture might validly command that the finding of an indictment, or mere proof of the
identity of the accused, should create a presumption of the existence of all the facts
essential to guilt. This is not permissible.
Id. at 469.
In later cases, Tot has been interpreted as sanctioning only a shift of the burden of
production to the defendant. Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157, n.16
(1979); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 519, n.9 (1979). However, it is not clear
whether that was the Tot Court's intention.
The academic writings about presumptions at this time continued to be dominated
by interpretations of the procedural effect of presumptions. Some authors also wrote
about how juries should be instructed on presumptions; they recognized that such in-
structions were frequently very confusing. The solutions varied significantly, however,
ranging from Morgan's argument that one reason presumptions should be held to shift
the burden of persuasion is that juries would then not have to hear about them at all, to
McCormick's suggestion that instructions be tailored to the facts of each case. Compare
Morgan, Presumptions, supra note 24, at 281 with McCormick, supra note 21, at 190. See
also Reaugh, supra note 11.
One author agreed that jury instructions about presumptions were complex and
hard to understand but rejected suggestions to simplify or eliminate them because accu-
racy was more important than comprehensibility. McBaine, supra note 22, at 527.




example, in Morissette v. United States,62 decided in 1952, the Court
avoided a challenge to the constitutionality of strict criminal liability
by construing a federal statute to require proof of mens rea. In a
less well-known part of the opinion, the Court focused on the word-
ing of a jury instruction about a presumption to determine the con-
stitutionality of the presumption. It held the instruction, which
concerned inferring intent from a person's acts, unconstitutional be-
cause it was expressed as a conclusive presumption, violating the
defendant's right to a hearing on the issue to which the presumption
pertained. 63
At this time, the cases and commentaries began suggesting the
possibility that the Constitution forbids giving the defendant the
burden of persuasion on some issues. 64 In 1957 in Roviaro v. United
States,65 the Court expressly construed a statutory presumption that
heroin was illegally imported with the defendant's knowledge upon
proof of possession as shifting only the burden of production, not
the burden of persuasion. 66 The opinion implied that shifting the
latter burden raised issues that the Court was not ready to address.
Over the next decade, the relationship of such statutory presump-
tions to the prosecution's burden of proof was repeatedly raised, as
the next section will discuss.
B. 1965 TO 1975
The Court did not decide any other major presumption cases
until the last half of the 1960s, when the Warren Court's criminal
procedure revolution was in full flower. By this time courts and
commentators usually characterized presumptions as at most shift-
62 342 U.S. 246 (1952). The Court's messages about the importance of subjective
responsibility to criminal liability were mixed. In the same year that it decided Morissette
the Court also held in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), that the Constitution
does not prohibit requiring defendants to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
The relationship of the insanity defense to mens rea and to the allocation of the burden
of persuasion reoccurred in the mid-1970s. See Saltzburg, Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal
Cases: Harmonizing the Views of the Justices, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 393, 408-10 (1983)(dis-
cussing New York. v. Patterson, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)).
63 Morissette 342 U.S. at 275. Conclusive presumptions have been held to deprive a
party of the due process right to a hearing since early in the century. See supra note 24.
64 In Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), a free speech case, the Court generally
disapproved of shifting the burden of persuasion when important individual rights were
at stake. But see Note, Constitutionality of Rebuttable Statutory Presumptions, 55 COLUM. L.
REV. 527 (1955).
65 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
66 Roviaro contains the first of a series of confusing comments to the effect that a
presumption shifted the burden of production to the defendant. Id. at 63. See discus-
sion hifra text accompanying notes 152-54.
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ing the burden of production to defendants. 67 Presumptions were
seen as a means of avoiding a directed verdict in favor of the de-
fendant on elements difficult for the prosecution to prove.68 From
1965 to 1970, the Court decided two pairs of important cases. The
holdings in each pair are difficult to reconcile with each other and
reveal uncertainty about how the due process requirement of funda-
mental fairness affects presumptions. In all the cases the Court said
that "rational connection" was the due process test, but its applica-
tion of the test changed markedly during these five years.
In the first pair of cases, decided in 1965, the Court's concep-
tion of the fundamental issue returned, at least in part, to the limits
on statutory presumptions that preempt judicial authority to deter-
mine whether a party has satisfied its burden of production. United
States v. Gainey 69 upheld a statute which provided that a person pres-
ent at a still was presumed to be "carrying on" a distillery business.
Justice Black dissented, arguing that the legislation intruded on the
domain of the trial court to determine, case by case, whether the
prosecution's evidence satisfied the burden of production. 70 His in-
terpretation was, of course, consistent with the usual understanding
of the effect ofpresumptions. 71 The majority asserted that, despite
67 One author argued that presumptions could shift the burden of production to the
defendant. Comment, supra note 23, at 154-58. Another recognized that if the burden
of production were shifted to the defendant in the traditional sense, it would amount to
directing a verdict against the defendant. Soules, Presumptions in Criminal Cases, 20 BAY-
LOR L. REV. 277, 283 (1969).
However, one of the best law review articles of the period still asserted that a pre-
sumption could shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant; it favored using the
strengh of the inference posited by the presumption and the likelihood that an innocent
person would be unable to rebut the presumption to determine when the defendant
could constitutionally be required to prove something. Ashford & Risinger, supra note
15. See also Comment, supra note 23, at 154.
68 Several articles argued that presumptions could satisfy the prosecution's burden
of production, permitting it to get to the jury where its evidence was otherwise insuffi-
dent. Holland & Chamberlin, Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Proof Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt?, 7 VAL. U.L. REV. 147 (1973); Sandier, The Statutory Presumption in Federal Narcotics
Prosecutions, 57J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 7, 9 (1966); Soules, supra note
67, at 284-87; Comment, supra note 23, at 142; Note, Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Judi-
cial Sleight of Hand, supra note 23, at 703-04.
Some authors saw that this might conflict with the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and proposed that the rational connection test be interpreted to re-
quire that the presumed fact follow from the proven fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
Christie & Pye, Presumptions and Assumptions in the Criminal Law: Another View, 1970 DUKE
LJ. 919, 924; Holland & Chamberlin, supra, at 161-64; Michelman, The Supreme Court
1968 Term, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 7, 110 (1969). Cf C. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, 344 (2d ed. 1972)(rational connec-
tion may be a test of relevancy or of probative sufficiency).
69 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
70 Id. at 76-77 (BlackJ., dissenting).
71 See supra Part I.A.
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the presumption, the trial judge could direct a verdict against the
prosecution if the evidence presented at trial was insufficient. It also
found the connection between the defendant's presence at a still
and "carrying on" a distillery sufficiently strong to be rational. 72
Later the same year the Court in United States v. Romano 73 held
unconstitutional a similar presumption-that a person present at
the site of a still "possessed" the still. The Court reconciled Romano
with Gainey by saying that "carrying on" was a broader offense than
possession, and that it was, therefore, rational to infer the former
but not the latter from presence. 74 The trial judge in Gainey was
careful to tell the jury that it was not bound to reach the conclusion
that the presumption called for,75 while the judge in Romano simply
read the statute containing the presumption to the jury.76 The
Court said that an instruction which authorized a finding based on
the presumption alone, as the Romano instruction did, required that
the proven fact be sufficient alone to support a finding of the pre-
sumed fact.77 Since an earlier Supreme Court decision had held
that presence alone was insufficient to support a finding of posses-
sion,78 the defendant's conviction had to be reversed, even though
72 Gainey, 380 U.S. at 67-68.
73 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
74 The distinction is difficult to make, since the offenses carried the same penalty and
were both defined in the same statute. 26 U.S.C. § 5601 (1958). But see Saltzburg, supra
note 62, at 413-14 (distinction makes sense because possession carries more stigma than
does carrying on).
75 See Gainey 380 U.S. at 69-70.
76 Romano, 382 U.S. at 137-38. The statute provided in relevant part that the defend-
ant's presence at the site of the illegal still shall be deemed sufficient evidence to author-
ize conviction, unless the defendant explains such presence to the satisfaction of the
jury. See 26 U.S.C. § 5601 (b).
77 Romano, 382 U.S. at 138-39. If there is more than one path that thejury can follow
to determine the defendant's guilt or innocence, each path must be free of constitutional
error. This rule is known as the two routes rule, which was first articulated in Stromberg
v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)(jury instruction authorized conviction if the jury
found that the defendant's acts were done with any of three purposes; if any of the three
were invalid the conviction could not stand). For an example of the test applied to pre-
sumptions, see infra note 93.
The possibility that ajury instruction might be interpreted as shifting the burden of
persuasion was not seriously at issue in Gainey or Romano. See Gainey, 380 U.S. at 70;
Romano, 382 U.S. passim. Justice Douglas, dissenting in part in Gainey, said that if the
statute were interpreted as compelling the jury to draw the inference it would violate the
right to trial by jury. Gainey, 380 U.S. at 72 (Douglas, J. dissenting). Justice Black dis-
sented, in part because he thought the instruction interfered with the right to jury trial.
Id. at 76-77 (Black, J., dissenting). Today the Gainey instruction might well be upheld as
permissive. It is quoted at 380 U.S. at 69-70. The Romano instruction, on the other
hand, would probably be interpreted as shifting the burden of persuasion. It is dis-
cussed at 382 U.S. 137. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 104-16.
78 Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 (1947).
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the totality of the evidence was sufficient to support it.79
By 1969, when the next presumption case was decided, the
Supreme Court was coming under attack for disregarding the truth-
finding function of criminal trials.80 Though ordinarily invoked in
criticism of decisions limiting police conduct, the emphasis on fact-
finding also prompted a re-examination of the process of proof at
trial. In 1970 in In re Winship,81 the Supreme Court held that due
process requires the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. At this time presumptions were still treated as a means of
satisfying, rather than allocating, the burden of persuasion.8 2
Therefore, presumptions potentially threatened proof requirements
by authorizing conviction on evidence that left more than a reason-
able doubt of guilt. This concern was expressed in terms of whether
the rational connection test meant that the presumed fact had to
follow from the basic fact beyond a reasonable doubt or whether it
only had to be more likely true than not true. United States v. Leary8 3
and Turner v. United States,84 decided in 1969 and 1970, were ex-
pected to answer this question, but the Court ducked. In both
cases, the Court purported to assess the strength of the logical rela-
tionship between the proven and presumed facts. It upheld some of
the presumptions, saying the presumed fact was true beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, and rejected others because the presumed fact was
not even more likely true than not true.8 5
The Court in Leary and Turner framed the fundamental issue as
the extent of legislative authority to declare one fact sufficient to
79 The majority apparently assumed that the trial judge could not direct a verdict
against the prosecution in the face of the statute. Cf. discussion of Gainey supra text
accompanying notes 70-72.
80 The commentators who emphasized the fact-finding function were reacting to the
Warren Court's perceived indifference to this function in its pursuit of other values such
as controlling governmental behavior that encroached on an individual's liberty, pro-
moting equality and racial justice, improving access to the courts, and enlarging judicial
supervision of criminal proceedings. See Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack
on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CH. L. REV. 142 (1970). See generally Allen, supra note 50;
Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MicH L.
REV. 1320 (1977); Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity
and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 436 (1980).
81 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
82 Neither of the presumption cases decided around the time of In re Winship ex-
pressed concern that ajury instruction on a presumption might shift the burden of per-
suasion. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); United States v. Leary, 395
U.S. 6 (1969). Indeed, the Court did not particularly focus on the instructions. See
Turner, 396 U.S. at 406-07; Leary, 395 U.S. at 30-31. In Turner, the Court did not even
consider the instructions important enough to quote. 396 U.S. at 406-07.
83 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
84 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
85 See infra text accompanying notes 88-90.
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prove another. It purported to defer to the legislature's judg-
ment,8 6 particularly since the questions that the presumptions os-
tensibly concerned were specialized, even arcane, and beyond the
general knowledge of the ordinary juror (or the Supreme Court).8 7
In fact, though, the Court deferred very little to Congress and un-
dertook an independent assessment of the facts in each case. In
Leary, a statute provided that one could presume from possession of
marijuana that it was illegally imported and that the defendant knew
this.8 8 Turner involved similar presumptions for heroin and co-
caine.8 9 Turner also concerned the validity of presuming from pos-
session that the defendant purchased heroin or cocaine not in or
from a stamped package. 90 To determine whether these presump-
tions were rational, the Court analyzed evidence not presented to
the jury about the incidence of marijuana, cocaine and heroin pro-
duction in the United States and how users of these drugs behave.
It upheld the presumptions about heroin and rejected those regard-
ing cocaine and marijuana.
The Court purported to use something like the Leary-Turner ap-
proach only one more time, in 1973. Barnes v. United States9 1 in-
volved the ancient common law presumption that the possessor of
recently stolen property is the thief. The Court was dubious that
one could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that possessors are
necessarily thieves, but it did not even attempt an empirical analysis.
Instead, it relied on the presumption's ancient pedigree to uphold
it.92 The Leary-Turner empirical analysis was unstable for two rea-
86 Leary, 395 U.S. at 36, 38.
87 As these cases are structured, it seems that if the legislative record had shown
factual support for the statutory presumption, the Court might have felt compelled to
defer to Congress. But, of course, it did not; the record showed instead that Congress
enacted the presumptions because the elements to which they pertained were very hard
or impossible to prove, which was usually the reason for statutory presumptions
throughout this century. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. at 38. See also United
States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 65 (1965); Holland & Chamberlin, supra note 68 at 151;
Sandler, supra note 68 at 8; Comment, supra note 23; Note, Statutory Criminal Presumptions:
Judicial Sleight of Hand, supra note 23; see articles cited supra note 23.
The elements presumed in Leary and Turner were the jurisdictional ones about ille-
gal importation and failure to pay stamp taxes, which no one took literally anyway. They
were, it seems, the product of an earlier era's view of how limited congressional author-
ity over intrastate activities was and the development of fake federal nexuses to avoid
any constitutional problem. See Sandier, supra note 68, at 8.
88 The Court rejected the presumption of knowledge as not being more likely true
than not true. Leary, 395 U.S. at 44-53.
89 The Court rejected the presumption about cocaine and upheld the one about her-
oin. Turner, 396 U.S. at 408-19.
90 Id. at 402-03.
91 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
92 Id. at 845. The Court also emphasized even more strongly than it did in Turner
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sons. Its method was ill-adapted to courts, especially appellate
courts, which have difficulty amassing and assessing facts necessary
to determine whether the relationship posited by a presumption is
generally true.93 Second, it limited so severely the legislature's au-
thority to declare one fact sufficient to prove another that presump-
tions lost much of their utility. The Court escaped from this box by
recharacterizing the basic nature of due process limits on presump-
tions, as the next section discusses.
III. THE NEw TESTS OF THE 1970S AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
The new emphasis on the trial's fact-finding function and the
constitutionalization of the proof beyond a reasonable doubt re-
quirement stimulated study of questions much more basic than how
due process limits presumptions. The most important question was
what the prosecution was obligated to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt. The standard reply, that it must prove the elements of the
crime, quickly gave rise to the question of how to distinguish an ele-
ment from a defense for constitutional purposes. Two major arti-
cles of the late 1960s addressed these questions. A basic question in
both articles was the circumstances under which a burden of proof
could fairly be allocated to a criminal defendant.
The first article concerned the substantive criteria for imposing
that the prosecution's circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support the conviction
without the presumption. Id.
93 The best example is Turner's discussion of the likelihood that a person in posses-
sion of heroin purchased it from other than the original stamped package. The majority
argued that (1) the heroin could not have come from a stamped package because only
registered importers and manufacturers may purchase stamps, and registered persons
do not deal in heroin because all heroin is illegally imported and (2) that the defendant
must have purchased the heroin because heroin is so high-priced that it would be very
unreasonable to assume that any sizable number of possessors have not paid for it. Tur-
ner, 396 U.S. 421-22.
In both cases the prosecution had, on some counts, a theory that did not require use
of a presumption. In Leary, the defendant knowingly brought marijuana into the United
States from Mexico that he had taken into Mexico in the first place. Id. at 30-32. On this
basis he could have been convicted of knowingly possessing illegally imported mari-
juana. In Turner, the defendant was found with 275 unstamped glassine bags of heroin,
which would warrant a finding of distribution, an alternative to convicting him of
purchasing heroin from an unstamped container. Turner, 396 U.S. at 419-21. Thus, in
both Leary and Turner, as in Romano, the jury was presented with alternative theories on
which to conclude that the defendant was guilty. United States v. Romano, 383 U.S. 136,
138-39 (1965). In Leary, as in Romano, the Court held that both routes had to be free of
significant error and so reversed the defendant's conviction. Cf Leary, 395 U.S. at 31-32;
Romano, 382 U.S. at 138-39. Romano is discussed supra note 77. Turner's approach to this
issue was more ambiguous-it asserted that if the presumption caused an error it would
be harmless, given the independent evidence of guilt, but it also was careful to assert
that the presumption was true beyond a reasonable doubt. Turner, 396 U.S. at 421.
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criminal liability on an individual. Its author concluded that liability
ought not to be imposed in the face of facts showing that the de-
fendant was not culpable. 94 As a corollary he argued that the prose-
cution should have the burden of persuasion on any fact pertinent
to an assessment of culpability. 95 The second article addressed evi-
dentiary devices that affect burdens of proof and their relationship
to the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It said that
presumptions are like affirmative defenses; both place some burden
of proof on the defendant. 96 Its authors argued that due process
invalidates any device that shifts a burden of proof to the defendant
if this shift could enhance the possibility of convicting innocent per-
sons.97 Therefore, they argued, an affirmative defense or a pre-
sumption may not require a defendant to prove anything that an
innocent person might be unable to prove.98 Though they never
explicitly defined "innocent," they used it to mean not characterized
by all the attributes that the legislature had decided were relevant to
punishment. 99
These articles applied the requirement of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt to the allocation of the burdens of proof, especially
the burden of persuasion. A 1975 case presented this allocation is-
sue to the Supreme Court, and the Court moved toward the analysis
suggested in the two articles, with its substantive and functional ap-
proach to the burdens of proof. Two years later, when the implica-
tions of this move became apparent, the Court retreated, adopting
in a second case a constitutional test for allocation of the burden of
persuasion tied to the formal structure of criminal statutes. In sub-
sequent cases the Court also created a new approach to presump-
tions based on the relationship between the structure of criminal
statutes and the weight and allocation of the prosecution's burden
of persuasion. A new definition of what is essential to fairness un-
derlies these changes: the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a
94 Fletcher, supra note 26, at 883-92.
95 Id. at 906-30.
96 Ashford & Risinger, supra note 15.
97 Id. at 180, 190.
98 Id. at 181, 190-91. This position is reminiscent of that ofJustice Brandeis in Mor-
rison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934), discussed supra text accompanying notes 45-49.
Responding to Ashford and Risinger, Christie and Pye argued that forbidding the legis-
lature to compromise a debate over whether to liberalize some substantive provision by
enacting it while allocating the burden of persuasion to the defendant in practice might
well result in a decision to retain the older, harsher law, to the defendant's disadvantage.
In short, they argued, Ashford and Risinger's position elevated form over substance. See
Christie & Pye, supra note 68.
99 Ashford & Risinger, supra note 15, passim.
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reasonable doubt and guilt must be determined by an independent
jury, acting on the basis of evidence presented at trial.
A. THE DEMISE OF USING PRESUMPTIONS TO MODIFY THE
SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND SATISFY THE BURDEN OF
PRODUCTION
Three of the cases, Mullaney v. Wilbur,100 New York v. Patterson,101
and Sandstrom v. Montana, ' 0 2 concern when the burden of persuasion
on an element can be allocated to the defendant. Ulster County Court
v. Allen'03 applied principles allied to those used in the first three
cases to fashion a conceptual structure and new tests for presump-
tions. Though none of the cases purported to be about constitu-
tional limits on substantive law, together they appear to push the
legislature toward a re-examination of the minimum conditions for
criminal liability. However, because of limits inherent in the cases
and because of the kinds of elements to which statutory presump-
tions usually apply, major substantive changes probably will not be
forthcoming.
1. Limits on Allocating the Burden of Persuasion to the Defendant
In 1975 the Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur'0 4 held that the prosecu-
tion must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of a crime
and that a rebuttable presumption that shifts the burden of persua-
sion on an element to the defendant is unconstitutional. Mullaney
emphasized the need to justify depriving people of liberty and im-
posing the stigma of criminality on them.' 0 5 The Court spoke
strongly of the role that the burden of persuasion plays in maintain-
ing public confidence in the criminal justice system.' 06 The opinion
was interpreted by some to mean that the prosecution must bear the
burden of persuasion on any fact relevant to an assessment of
culpability.10 7
The problem with this reading of Mullaney, of course, is that it
would require the substantial revision of assignments of the burden
100 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
101 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
102 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
103 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
104 421 U.S. 684 (1975). The Court cited the article by Fletcher discussed supra text
accompanying notes 94-95. Mullaney, 412 U.S. at 694, 695, nn.16, 20.
105 Id. at 698-700.
106 421 U.S. at 700.
107 See, e.g., Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions and Burden of Proof in Criminal Law,
88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1338-44 (1979) and articles cited therein at n.40.
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of persuasion for affirmative defenses in many jurisdictions. 108 Fur-
ther, it suggested that due process requires the substantive law to
take cognizance of defenses that many jurisdictions did not recog-
nize. 0 9 Not surprisingly, two years later in New York v. Patterson"I0
the Court backed away from these implications. It held that while
the prosecution bears the burden of persuasion on all elements of a
crime, the formal structure of the statute will determine these ele-
ments. Like Mullaney, Patterson said that some constitutional limits
on allocating the burden of persuasion to defendants are linked to
limits on the underlying substantive law, but Patterson's limits are far
more modest than Mullaney's. Patterson subjected the legislature's
power to decide what is an element and what is an affirmative de-
fense only to vague and limited constraints."'
Together Patterson and Mullaney have also come to mean that
once the legislature has allocated the risk of error between prosecu-
tion and defense by defining elements of the crime and affirmative
defenses, it cannot require the defendant to prove still more
through the use of a rebuttable presumption. Patterson affirmed
108 Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur, The Supreme Court and the Substantive Criminal Law-An
Examination of the Limits of Legitimate Intervention, 55 TEx. L. Rav. 269 (1977). See Jeffries &
Stephan, supra note 107, at 1339-44.
109 See, e.g., Tushnet, Constitutional Limitation of Substantive Criminal Law: An Examination
of the Meaning of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 55 B.U.L. REv. 775 (1975).
110 432 U.S. 197 (1977). Patterson, like Mullaney, involved the mitigation of homicide
from murder to manslaughter because of the killer's emotional agitation. See Patterson,
432 U.S. at 197-98; Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 686-87. New York's statutes were based on the
Model Penal Code; malice aforethought was not an element of murder under its stat-
utes, and extreme emotional disturbance, the rough equivalent of heat of passion, was
an affirmative defense to be proved by the defendant. Patterson, 432 U.S at 197-98, nn. 1-
3.
111 Id. at 210. It is important, though, that those vague constitutional limits are recog-
nized; by doing this the Court continued the practice it had followed in, inter alia, Pow-
ell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); and
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), of avoiding explicit constitutionalization of
the substantive criminal law while holding out the promise that some limits do exist. For
a more extended treatment, see Angel, Substantive Due Process and the Criminal Law, 9 Loy.
U. CHI. LJ. 61 (1977).
The Court gave practical and principled reasons for rejecting MIullaney's implica-
tions. Patterson, 432 U.S at 207-09. It argued that requiring the prosecution to prove all
facts relevant to culpability would impede reform, since the legislature could not enact a
substantive rule more lenient than the existing one while giving the defendant the bur-
den of persuasion. Id. Cf. Christie & Pye, supra note 68. As a matter of principle the
Court justified giving the states broad latitude to decide whether a fact will be an ele-
ment or an affirmative defense by saying that, with a few exceptions, the states do not
have to recognize any particular facts as relevant to criminal liability at all. Patterson, 432
U.S. at 210. Cf. the discussion of Holmes' argument in favor of the greater-includes-the-
lesser test supra text accompanying notes 38-39. The same kind of analysis underlies the
Court's recent sanctioning of a conclusive presumption. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
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Mullaney's holding that rebuttable presumptions which shift the bur-
den of persuasion to the defendant on the elements of a crime are
inconsistent with the prosecution's burden of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. 1 2 In 1979 in Sandstrom v. Montanal1 3 the Court re-
lied in part on this aspect of Mullaney to hold unconstitutional a jury
instruction which said that a person is presumed to intend the natu-
ral and probable consequences of his or her acts.'1 4 Since the jury
could have interpreted the presumption instruction as conclusive 15
or as shifting the burden of persuasion on intent to the defend-
ant,1 16 it violated due process.
Mullaney, Patterson and Sandstrom make sense only at a formal
level. With few exceptions, a fact can constitutionally be made irrel-
evant to criminal liability or it can be an affirmative defense which
the defendant must prove. But a fact cannot be an element of the
crime that will be presumed once some other fact is proven if the
112 432 U.S. at 213-16.
113 442 U.S. 510 (1979). Sandstrom was charged with deliberate homicide. He ad-
mitted doing the killing, but denied that he did so purposely or knowingly because of a
personality disorder aggravated by alcohol consumption. Id. at 512. Thus, the only fac-
tual issue was whether he intended the victim's death. Id.
114 This presumption has an ancient pedigree. For many years there was a lively dis-
pute about whether this was really a presumption that could be rebutted or whether it
was a substantive rule, expressing objective rather than subjective criminal liability. See,
e.g., J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 117-19 (1960); 0. HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW ch. 2 (1881); J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
110-22 (1883);J. THAYER, supra note 24, at 335; G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GEN-
ERAL PART 35 (2d ed. 1961); Keeton, supra note 24; Turner, The Mental Element in Crime at
Common Law, 6 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 31, 40-41 (1936).
115 The Court's aversion to conclusive presumptions was not new. See supra note 24.
Nor was its condemnation of jury instructions that require the jury to conclude that a
criminal defendant intended the consequences of his or her acts. In Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), which is remembered mostly for its strong statement
against strict liability, the Court condemned such an instruction. Conclusive presump-
tions, the Court said, violate the right to have the jury determine whether the govern-
ment proved all of the elements of the crime. Id. at 274-76.
In United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), the Court again
returned to the theme that conclusive presumptions are unconstitutional, violating the
right to a hearing and intruding on the jury's fact-finding function. It said that an in-
struction in the form of an inference would have been permissible. Id. at 446.
In a departure from precedent, the Court recently held in a civil case that a statutory
conclusive presumption is merely an awkwardly expressed substantive rule and is, there-
fore, constitutional. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1976).
116 In Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985), Justices Rehnquist, Burger and
O'Connor argued in dissent that the language in Sandstrom forbidding rebuttable pre-
sumptions is merely dicta. Their opinion does not deal with Mullaney. Franklin, 471 U.S.
at 333 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The most recent edition of MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE interprets Sandstrom and
Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979), discussed infra notes 120-36, as per-
mitting presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant. MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE, supra note 3, at 997.
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presumption shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant.1 17
The key to applying these cases is determining what the elements of
a crime are, and that is determined very formally, from the structure
of the statute.' 18
Sandstrom's prohibition of jury instructions couched as rebutta-
ble presumptions precludes one traditional use of presumptions: al-
l 17 Another problem with these cases is the inconsistent way in which they treat the
question of whether form or substance is crucial. To say that the legislature can make
something an affirmative defense but not a rebuttably-presumed element seems to indi-
cate that form has independent value. On the other hand, the rationale of Patterson is
that so long as the legislature's goal is constitutional, how it goes about attaining its end
does not matter.
Some argue that in essence the rebuttable, burden-of-persuasion shifting presump-
tion is the same thing as an affirmative defense. Allen, supra note 6, at 321, 324-25, 330;
Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 107, at 1336; Sheldon, Presumptions Against Criminal Defend-
ants, Affirmative Defenses, and a Substantive Due Process Interpretation of County Court of Ulster
v. Allen, 34 ME. L. REV. 277, 278 (1982); Wilson, Shifting Burdens in Criminal Law: A
Burden of Due Process, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 731, 756 (1981). In terms of where the
burden of persuasion lies at the close of the evidence, such a rebuttable presumption
and an affirmative defense are the same. However, a presumption that shifts the burden
of persuasion on an element comes into play only if the prosecution produces sufficient
evidence of the basic fact. If it does not, the presumed fact remains an element on which
the prosecution bears the burden of persuasion. Thus, such a presumption turns the
presumed fact into the functional equivalent of an affirmative defense only if the base
fact is proven. A second variable to consider is that the base fact may or may not itself
be an element. If it is, then the presumed fact becomes an affirmative defense. If it is
not an element, however, the presumption redefines the crime in the alternative so that
the base fact is an element and the presumed fact an affirmative defense or so that the
element is the presumed fact. The presumption at issue in Ulster County is a good exam-
ple. The presumption of possession from presence in a car containing a gun redefined
the crime so that it was either 1) possession of a gun, or 2) presence in a car containing a
gun with the affirmative defense of not being the possessor. See supra note 20.
118 Some who have tried to make sense of the cases have argued that constitutional
limits on affirmative defenses and presumptions are tied to limits on the underlying sub-
stantive law. Allen, The Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens & Persuasion
After Patterson v. New York, 76 MicH. L. REV. 30,43-46 (1977);Jeffries & Stephan, supra
note 107, at 1344-59. Allen has further argued that the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt applies only to constitutionally necessary factors and means that any
device that lessens this burden violates due process. He has said that the Constitution
does not limit in any way devices that effectively require the defendant to prove anything
else. Allen, supra note 6, at 339-41. As others have pointed out, though, the contours of
constitutional limits on substantive law are indistinct and limited. Nesson, Rationality,
Presumptions and Judicial Comment: A Response to Professor Allen, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1574,
1576-81 (1981); Saltzburg, supra note 62, at 401-07; Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales
ofJustice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1325-29 (1977). If the
principles of Mullaney and Sandstrom apply only to constitutionally necessary elements,
they are not especially important. Further, this theory assumes that the legislature's
underlying substantive decision is the only issue of constitutional importance; how it
chooses to implement substance does not matter. While there is a certain logic to this
position, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected it. Holmes' greater-includes-the-
lesser test rested on the same assumption. See supra at text accompanying notes 38-42.
This test was clearly rejected in Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 472 (1943).
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tering the substantive law.119 Sandstrom, therefore, tends to
encourage the legislature to express in more straightforward ways
what the state must prove to justify punishing a person. Mullaney
and Patterson have a similar tendency.
2. Using Presumptions to Satisfy the Burden of Production
In 1979, the same year in which Sandstrom was decided, the
Court in Ulster County Court v. Allen 120 reconsidered when the legisla-
ture may enact a presumption that declares proof of one fact suffi-
cient to prove another. Though the Court continued to say that the
Constitution requires a rational connection between the proven and
presumed facts, the meaning of the test was changed substantially.
Attention shifted from an assessment of the statute creating the pre-
sumption to the jury instruction concerning how to use it.
The defendants in Ulster County Court were charged with unlaw-
ful possession of guns. A statute provided that a person present in
an automobile containing a firearm was presumed to possess the
firearm. 121 This presumption illustrates well the problems with the
Leafy-Turner test developed ten years earlier. 122 Intuitively it seems
unlikely that one can say beyond a reasonable doubt that people in
cars where guns are found generally possess them. Even if an em-
pirical answer could be found, a court would have difficulty marshal-
ling and assessing the facts. 123
To avoid this problem the Court for the first time divided pre-
sumptions into two categories, permissive and mandatory, 124 with a
different rational connection test for each. The wording of the jury
instruction about a presumption determines whether it is permissive
or mandatory. 125
119 See supra text accompanying notes 15-20.
120 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
121 New York Penal Law § 265.15 (3) (McKinney 1967), quoted in Ulster County Court,
442 U.S. 142 n.1.
122 See supra text accompanying notes 83-93.
123 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit nevertheless tried, concluding that
the presumption failed the Leary test. Allen v. Ulster County Court, 568 F.2d 998 (2d
Cir. 1977).
124 The 1954 edition of MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE first used this terminology. C. Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 12, at 640. The 1972 edition abandoned this usage, saying that
permissive presumptions are inferences and should be so labeled to avoid confusion.
MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, supra note 68, at 804.
125 Ulster County Court, 442 U.S. at 157 n.16. This emphasis is, in a sense, misleading.
Ordinarily differences in the wording ofjury instructions raise either the permissibility
of shifting a burden of persuasion or how much control the judge legitimately exercises
over the jury's deliberations. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 7-14.
In Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), these are exactly the issues that the
jury instruction was used to raise. If the jury understood that the presumption shifted
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"Permissive presumptions" are not really presumptions at all.
Instead, they are simply inferences drawn from evidence. They do
not shift the prosecution's burden of production, 12 6 and the jury is
not required to abide by them. An instruction about a "permissive
presumption" is really an instructed inference. Therefore, the Court
said the "presumed," (i.e., inferred) fact does not have to follow
from the proven fact in the abstract, 12 7 nor does the proven fact
have to be sufficient alone to establish the inferred fact beyond a
reasonable doubt. 12 8 If in light of the evidence as a whole the infer-
ence is more likely true than not true in the particular case, the in-
ference is "rational" and the conviction should be upheld. 29
The opinion did not discuss what would happen if the trial
judge found the evidence taken as a whole to be insufficient. The
implication of the Court's analysis is that, since a "permissive pre-
sumption" is not a rule of law but merely an inference that may be
drawn, it has no force independent of the evidence presented.
Therefore, an inference would not save the prosecution's case just
because it was expressed as a statutory presumption. In short, Ulster
County Court collapsed the question of the validity of a "permissive
presumption" into a general sufficiency of the evidence test.'30
In dicta the Court discussed "mandatory presumptions," which
the jury must accept and may not reject on an independent evalua-
tion of the state's evidence. 131 Such a presumption must satisfy the
Leary-Turner test,1 3 2 that is, the presumed fact must in the abstract
follow from the proven fact beyond a reasonable doubt. 133 In the-
the burden of persuasion, it violated limits on such shifts. Id. at 524. If the presumption
was conclusive, the judge invaded the jury's province. Id. at 521-23. See supra text ac-
companying notes 113-16.
The Court in Ulster County Court, though, did not even address the instruction's ef-
fect on the burden of persuasion or the distribution of power between judge and jury.
The only issue it considered was whether the evidence was sufficient to support the
conviction. Id. at 163-67. Of course, sufficiency of the evidence does raise a judge-jury
control issue, but it is a different one-whether the judge should deprive the jury of
decision-making authority altogether by taking a question from it. See supra text section
I.A.
126 Ulster County Court, 442 U.S. at 157. Evidence scholars do not consider such de-
vices to be true presumptions, calling them instead inferences. See supra text accompany-
ing note 5.
127 Ulster County Court, 442 U.S. at 157.
128 Id. at 157.
121) Id. at 163-65.
130 Some, including the dissenters, have characterized the majority in Ulster County
Court as reducing the analysis of the presumption to a harmless error test. Id. at 176
(Powell, J., dissenting).
131 Id. at 157-58.
132 Id. at 162.
13-3 Id. at 166-67.
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ory this test permits legislative control over sufficiency of the evi-
dence issues, but because it is so very demanding, the legislature's
domain has probably been eliminated as a practical matter.'3 4
Moreover, a jury instruction expressed as a "mandatory presump-
tion" probably cannot survive the Mullaney-Patterson-Sandstrom
test, 3 5 as the next section demonstrates.
Ulster County Court's prohibitions of "permissive presumptions"
unsupported by evidence and of "mandatory presumptions" that
are not true beyond a reasonable doubt do not purport to be about
the underlying substantive law. Like Sandstrom,13 6 however, Ulster
County Court tends to push the legislature toward reexamining what
the minimum conditions for criminal liability should be.
3. The Minimal Effects of These Cases on Substantive Law
Sandstrom's prohibition of rebuttable presumptions that shift the
burden of persuasion to the defendant and Ulster County Court's pro-
hibition of legislative presumptions that permit the prosecution to
get to the jury with otherwise insufficient evidence have the poten-
tial to require major restructuring of the substantive criminal law.
Examination of the presumptions that have actually reached the
Supreme Court in recent years shows that this is unlikely.13 7
The first type of presumption excuses the prosecution from
proving elements of a crime that establish federal jurisdiction and
which would indeed be difficult to prove. Examples include the pre-
sumption in Tot v. United States '3 8 that a person previously convicted
of a violent crime received a gun in interstate commerce after July
30, 1938, and the presumptions in Leary v. United States '3 9 and Turner
v. United States 140 that drugs in the defendant's possession were ille-
134 This is particularly important, since legislatures have historically enacted statutory
presumptions to relieve prosecutors from having to prove difficult elements of crimes.
See supra notes 23 & 35.
135 See discussion infra text accompanying notes 151-54.
136 See supra text accompanying note 119.
137 The most problematic presumptions are those which say that a person's proximity
to some item implies that the person possessed the item. See, e.g., Ulster County Court
v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979)(person found in car with a gun presumed to possess it).
The problem lies not in the presumption but in defining and containing the doctrine of
constructive possession. See Whitebread & Stevens, Constructive Possession in Narcotics
Cases: To Have and Have Not, 58 VA. L. REV. 751 (1972). The Ulster County Court require-
ment that a finding of possession be supported by the evidence produced may mean that
some defendants who would have been convicted will be acquitted for insufficient evi-
dence. If this result is not acceptable, the legislature will have to decide whether to
enact a statute that criminalizes proximity to the item.
138 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
139 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
140 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
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gally imported.' 4' Today's understanding of the scope of congres-
sional authority makes reliance on these contrived jurisdictional
findings unnecessary. 42 Modern federal statutes do not have such
elements, 43 and their removal from the older style statutes should
be merely a housekeeping task.
The second group of presumptions are standardized inferences
of culpable mental states from proof that the defendant was associ-
ated with an item or performed some act. Examples are the infer-
ence in Sandstrom that a person intends the natural and probable
consequences of her acts 1 44 and in Barnes v. United States 14 5 that one
in possession of recently stolen mail knows it was stolen.146 In such
cases the prosecution ordinarily will not need to rely on a formal
presumption to meet its burden of production, since even without
the presumption the mental state can reasonably be inferred from
the evidence.
141 Others are Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413 (1928)(purchase of drugs from
other than stamped package presumed from absence of required stamps on drugs in
defendant's possession); Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925)(illegal importa-
tion of heroin after 1909 presumed from possession).
142 For a discussion of the 1970 federal legislation, particularly its commerce clause
implications, see R. BOGOMOLNY, M. SONNENREICH & A. ROCCOGRANDI, A HANDBOOK ON
THE 1970 FEDERAL DRUG ACT 63-65 (1970). See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 150-59 (1978). As late as 1966 a commentator still argued
that the commerce clause required a specific effect on interstate or foreign commerce to
justify a federal criminal statute prohibiting the possession of drugs. Sandler, supra
note 68, at 8.
143 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-969, especially §§ 841 & 844. These provisions have repeat-
edly been upheld in the face of commerce clause objections. See, e.g., United States v.
Lopez, 461 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Lane, 461 F.2d 343 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 952 (1972); United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 831 (1973); United States v. Davis, 561 F.2d 1014 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 929 (1977); United States v. Weinrich, 586 F.2d 481 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
927 (1979).
144 442 U.S. 510, 512 (1979).
145 412 U.S. 837, 838 (1937).
146 Other examples include Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904)(knowledge that
items are numbers slips presumed from their possession) and Hawes v. Georgia, 258
U.S. 1 (1922)(knowledge of a still's presence presumed if found on the defendant's
land).
See also State v. Rainey, 298 Or. 459, 693 P.2d 635 (1985)(knowledge of character of
a controlled substance presumed from proof of its unlawful delivery); People v. Roder,
33 Cal. 3d 491, 658 P.2d 1302, 189 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1983)(knowledge that property was
stolen presumed from proof that defendant was a dealer in secondhand merchandise
who bought or received stolen property and who failed to make reasonable inquiry
whether the person from whom the property was bought had the legal right to sell it
under circumstances which should have caused him to make such an inguiry); State v. De
La Ossa, 128 Ariz. 37, 623 P.2d 826 (1981)(purchase of stolen property at a price sub-
stantially below its fair market value permits a conclusion that the purchaser was aware
of the risk that it had been stolen).
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B. JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE JURY'S DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
The Supreme Court in Ulster County Court v. Allen 147 and Sand-
strom v. Montana,1 48 as well as most current commentators, conclude
that the due process test for presumptions and inferences must in-
sure that the jury's role as an independent decision-maker is pro-
tected. In Ulster County Court and Sandstrom, as well as two later
cases, the Court mandated a highly formal analysis of judge-jury
communications that provides only symbolic protection for the jury.
A reform proposed by some commentators, to turn presumption
and inference instructions into comments on the evidence, might
enhance the rationality of the jury but not necessarily its indepen-
dence. Further, some state courts have been reluctant to accept the
conversion of instructed inferences to comments on the evidence
because of the legal and practical problems comments can create.
1. The Fate ofJury Independence in the Supreme Court
Sandstrom held that if a particular subjective state of mind is an
element of a crime, whether a defendant had this state of mind is a
question of fact for the jury, not a legal conclusion that follows from
proof of the defendant's actions. More generally Sandstrom, together
with Mullaney and Patterson, means that the jury must be free to de-
termine whether the prosecution has proven every element of the
crime. In this sense the Court supported a shift of decision-making
power from judge tojury. But this aspect of the case amounted only
to a reaffirmation of a well-accepted principle.1 4 9 In contrast, Sand-
strom's test for the validity of jury instructions does little or nothing
to free the jury's fact-finding responsibility from effective control by
the judge and in fact insulates the judge's communications from any
real scrutiny as to how they affect the jury. 150
Sandstrom requires that jury instructions about presumptions be
read closely so they can be fit into the proper category. If the judge
says, "The law presumes . . ." Sandstrom may well have been vio-
lated. But the judge may convey the same message to the jury by
beginning, "You may infer.. . ." Presumption instructions are for-
bidden; only instructed inferences are allowed.
At what point an instruction crosses the line into forbidden ter-
ritory is not clear, but Sandstrom does say that instructions must be
147 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
148 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
149 See United States v. United States Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422 (1978); Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
150 See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
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interpreted from the point of view of the jury. If the jury could rea-
sonably have understood that the presumption was conclusive or
that it shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant, it is
erroneous. 151
These principles shed some light on one of the ambiguities
that remains in the wake of Sandstrom and Ulster County Court: the
meaning of a "presumption that shifts the burden of production."
Many cases, including these two, mention such a device without ex-
plaining what it is.152 The holdings of these two cases, however,
preclude shifting the burden to the defendant in the conventional
sense. 153 Sandstrom requires that the jury understand that it alone
151 Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 316; Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. at 516-19.
152 In Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979), the Court defined a
mandatory presumption as one that tells the jury that it must find the presumed fact
upon proof of the basic fact, at least unless the defendant has come forward with some
evidence to rebut the presumed connection between the two facts. The jury cannot
reject a mandatory presumption on an independent evaluation of the state's evidence.
Id. at 159. The Court said that most mandatory presumptions in its prior cases shifted
only the burden of production to the defendant. Id. at 157 n. 16. Evaluation of these
statements must take into account that Ulster County Court was decided before Sandstrom
v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), discussed supra text accompanying notes 113-18.
In Sandstrom, the state argued that the presumption only shifted the burden of pro-
duction to the defendant. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 516 n.15. The Court rejected this in-
terpretation and questioned in a footnote what it might mean to shift the burden of
production to the defendant in a criminal case. Id.
The Court also raised, but did not decide, the validity of a burden of production-
shifting presumption in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 n.3 (1985).
153 Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 516 n.5 (citing United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.,
430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977); Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 (1947);
Mins v. United States, 375 F.2d 135, 148 (5th Cir. 1967). If a party suffers a directed
verdict for failure to satisfy a burden of production, allocation of the production burden
to that party also amounts to allocation of the burden of persuasion. Assuming that the
presumption applies to an element of the crime, if the presumption shifted the burden
of production so that the burden of persuasion was also shifted, the presumption would
violate Sandstrom. See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 524. This, however, is just another way of
talking about the problem presented by the question of what it means to direct a verdict
against a defendant.
As a practical matter, of course, verdicts are directed against criminal defendants all
the time. The most obvious example is with affirmative defenses; if the defendant does
not produce enough evidence, the jury simply will not be instructed on the defense. See
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1979).
Burdens of production are also shifted to defendants on defenses that negate ele-
ments, such as mistake of fact and intoxication. If the defendant does not produce
enough evidence to support the claimed defense, a verdict is effectively directed in favor
of the prosecution when the judge refuses to instruct the jury on the defense. This is
more troublesome, doctrinally, since it is hard to square with Sandstrom. Nevertheless,
this practice will continue. The prosecution simply is not going to be required to negate
claims that the defendant does not make, and the jury is not going to be instructed on
issues that the facts have not raised. This problem flows from current insistence on
dealing with questions ofjury instruction within the very formal framework of elements
and affirmative defenses. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 120 n.20 (1982).
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has the authority to determine whether all of the elements have
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, precluding the judge from
taking an element from the jury and directing its finding. Ulster
County Court prevents the legislature from enacting a presumption
that requires the judge to send a case to the jury if the evidence is
otherwise insufficient to support a guilty verdict.
The remaining interpretation of "shifting the burden of pro-
duction to the defendant" is that the judge strongly urges the jury to
reach a conclusion consistent with the presumption unless the de-
fendant produces sufficient rebuttal evidence.' 54 Such an instruc-
tion could easily be interpreted as shifting the burden of persuasion
to the defendant and thus is risky to use. Given how easy it is to
urge the same conclusion on the jury in the form of an instructed
inference, presumption instructions are unlikely to survive except as
slips of the trial judge's tongue.
The formalism of this analysis does not satisfactorily address
the question of how strongly the judge may urge a conclusion on the
jury. Assuming that the coercive effect of instructions varies de-
pending on the language used, it is still very hard to believe that
jurors hear, much less are profoundly affected by, the kinds of dif-
ferences that Sandstrom makes crucial.155
The treatment of instructed inferences in Ulster County Court suf-
fers from a similar flaw. The Court said that an instructed inference
does not have to be generally valid because the jury is not required
to abide by it.1 56 This holding fails to acknowledge the problem
154 See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 401-02 (1970); Leary v. United States,
395 U.S. 6, 31 n.52 (1969); United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 137 (1965). Statutes
containing presumptions are often phrased so that they appear to shift at least the bur-
den of production to the defendant, as that is conventionally understood. See id.
Alternatively, people who talk about the burden of production being shifted to the
defendant may envision only an instruction that permits the jury to make a finding. If
so, this is the same thing as an instructed inference, which the Court calls a permissive
presumption. Such an instruction does not shift a burden of production to the defend-
ant in the conventional sense. What this characterization seems to mean is that the very
act of commending a conclusion to the jury does, as a practical matter, almost force the
defendant to produce rebuttal evidence.
155 The emphasis on differences in jury instructions and case-by-case, fact-oriented
analysis has left the lower courts without adequate guidance. For examples of the prob-
lem see Oakes, The Status of Sandstrom in the Second Circuit, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 641
(1983); Note, Life After Sandstrom: The Use of Criminal Presumptions in the Second Circuit, 49
BROOKLYN L. REv. 1089 (1983); Note, After Sandstrom: The Constitutionality of Presumptions
That Shift the Burden of Production, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 519. Categorizing instructions as
permissive or mandatory is not easy. It is, for example, far from clear whether the jury
in Ulster County Court would have understood whether it was required to draw the infer-
ence suggested by the presumption instruction. See Ulster Countv Court, 442 U.S. at 160-
62, nn.19-22.
156 Id. at 157.
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created by an instruction that posits an inference which is, in the
general run of cases, questionable. Earlier cases 157 and Sandstrom 158
say that if a jury may have arrived at a general verdict by more than
one route, each of those routes must be free of error. An inference
phrased abstractly and in general terms authorizes the jury to con-
vict based only on the relationship described by the instructions, as
the Court has previously recognized. 159 If the relationship is not
generally true, the instruction pushes the jury to reach a conclusion
based only on the strength of the judge's word. 160
In the three cases concerning the remedy for a Sandstrom viola-
tion the Court had an opportunity to develop meaningful limits on
the trial judge's communications to the jury. Though these cases
produced eleven opinions, none of them deals well with the prob-
lem, and the effect of the holdings is to eliminate Sandstrom as an
important limit on what judges tell juries while building a monu-
ment to jury decision-making.
In Francis v. Franklin,16' decided in 1985, the Court decided
157 Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 31-32 (1969); Brotherhood of Carpenters v.
United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408-09 (1947); Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607,
611-14 (1946); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
158 Ulster County Court, 442 U.S. at 519-26.
159 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 275 (1952), in which the Court said,
A presumption which would permit but not require the jury to assume intent from
an isolated fact would prejudge a conclusion which the jury should reach of its own
volition. A presumption which would permit the jury to make an assumption which
all the evidence considered together does not logically establish would give to a
proven fact an artificial and fictional effect.
See also Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 235 (1911). This is true whether the presump-
tion is permissive or mandatory.
The dissent in Ulster County Court made the same point. Uster County Court, 442 U.S.
at 175-77 (Powell, J., dissenting). Cf. Nesson, supra note 118, at 1586.
160 On the other hand, Ulster County Court has been interpreted as holding that pre-
sumption instructions should be turned into judicial comments while taking liberties
with the facts of the particular case. Nesson, supra note 118, at 1584. This, however,
assumes that the instructions actually given are not approved as a model.
Mandatory presumptions, which Ulster County Court defined as those that the jury
must abide by and which may be the only basis for finding an element, also present
obvious problems for jury independence. Ulster County Court, 442 U.S. at 166-67. If the
jury is told that it must find consistently with the presumption absolutely unless the
defendant rebuts it, Sandstrom would be violated. Further, it would be impermissible to
instruct the jury that it could reach the conclusion called for by a presumption without
presenting evidence which supports the conclusion. Allen, supra note 6; Nesson, Reason-
able Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1215,
(1979). If so, in theory the prosecution could present evidence in support of the pre-
sumption's postulate and the defense could present rebuttal evidence. As a practical
matter, of course, this requirement would eliminate the use of presumptions in the kind
of situation for which they have most often been enacted: to help the prosecutor in
situations where proving a specific fact would be difficult or impossible. See sources
cited supra note 23.
161 471 U.S. 307 (1985).
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how to apply the rule that an erroneous instruction must be read in
the context of the charge as a whole to determine if it amounts to a
constitutional violation. 162 The majority held that a conclusive or
rebuttable presumption instruction is constitutionally erroneous if a
"reasonable juror" could have understood the instruction as shifting
the burden of persuasion to the defendant and nothing else in the
charge explained the error.1 63 Justice Rehnquist, writing in dissent,
would have found constitutional error only if it were likely that a
"reasonable juror" understood the instruction as shifting the bur-
den of persuasion.164
As the majority said, an appellate court cannot be certain
whether a given jury pieced together an accurate understanding of
the law from all of the instructions.165 . In such cases it favored a test
that emphasizes the integrity of the jury's decision-making process.
The dissenters characterized the majority's approach as creating the
risk of finding constitutional error "after finely parsing through the
elements of state crimes that are really far removed from the
problems presented by the burden of proof charge in Winship."'166
In two cases dealing with the harmless error 167 test for a Sand-
strom violation the Court split along similar lines. In the first case,
Connecticut v. Johnson,168 decided in 1983, the Court split four to four
with Justice Stevens concurring in the judgment without addressing
the merits. In 1986 in Rose v. Clark 169 Justice Stevens took the posi-
tion of the dissenters in Johnson to establish that Sandstrom errors can
be harmless.' 70
In Johnson the plurality argued that a Sandstrom error should be
considered harmless only if the instruction was given in connection
with an offense for which the defendant was acquitted or if the de-
fendant conceded the issue of intent.' 7 ' The plurality reasoned that
162 Id. at 315. This is the rule articulated in Cupp v. Naughton, 414 U.S. 141 (1973).
163 Id. at 316. The majority further held that even under the harmless error standard
proposed by the dissent in Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 97 n.5 (1983)(Powell,
J., dissenting), the instruction was not harmless. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 326. For a discus-
sion ofJohnson, see infra text accompanying notes 168-80.
164 Franklin, 471 U.S. at 342 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
165 Id. at 322.
166 Id. at 342 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
167 Constitutional error is not the same as harmful error. Whether the instructions
taken as a whole are erroneous is an issue separate and distinct from the harmless error
analysis. Together these tests provide two ways that an appellate court may avoid re-
versing a conviction because of an erroneous jury instruction.
168 460 U.S. 73 (1983).
169 106 S. Ct. 3101 (1986).
170 Justice White shifted from the plurality in Johnson to the majority in Clark, so that
the Clark decision now expresses the majority view of the Court.
171 Johnson, 460 U.S. at 87.
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a conclusive presumption instruction is the functional equivalent of
a directed verdict.' 72 The dissenters, who ultimately prevailed in
Clark, said that this analogy is inapt.' 73 The dissenters argued that a
Sandstrom error should be considered harmless if, on the record as a
whole, an appellate court could say beyond a reasonable doubt that
it did not contribute to the guilty verdict. 174
All of the Justices agreed in Johnson and Clark that an instruction
should not be phrased conclusively. They purported to disagree
about how a jury will use such an instruction if it is given.' 75 The
plurality in Johnson argued that a conclusive presumption instruction
would have led [the jury] to ignore the evidence in finding that the
State had proved respondent guilty beyond a reasonable doubt ...
The jury thus would have failed to consider whether there was any
evidence tending to cast doubt on this element of the crime .... Be-
cause a conclusive presumption eases the jury's task, "there is no rea-
son to believe the jury would have deliberately undertaken the more
difficult task" of evaluating the evidence of intent.176
The Johnson dissenters responded:
Contrary to the plurality's assumption, a Sandstrom type presumption
does not operate independently of the evidence. The jury must look
to the evidence initially to see if the basic facts have been proved
before it can consider whether it is appropriate to apply the presump-
tion .... If, however, these basic facts are themselves dispositive of
intent, the presumption becomes unnecessary to the jury's task of find-
ing intent. Because the presumption does not remove the issue of in-
tent from the jury's consideration, it does not preclude a reviewing
court from determining whether the error was "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt."' 177
Because of rules protecting the secrecy of jury deliberations,
how juries integrate instructions with the evidence cannot be
proven. It is, therefore, impossible to determine which group of
Justices is right. TheJustices were really arguing about whether the
deliberation process that a particular jury uses is of constitutional
importance. The plurality, which considered fatal the possibility
that the instruction short .circuited the jury's deliberations, was ar-
guing that jury deliberations free from erroneous influence by the
judge are essential to a fair trial. The dissenters, who imagined the
172 Id. at 84.
173 Id. at 95-97.
174 Id. at 97, 102.
175 On one level, the dispute may simply be about whether juries will obey such an
instruction. Given the secrecy of jury deliberations, this is an unanswerable empirical
question.
176 Johnson, 460 U.S. at 84-85.
177 Id. at 96-97.
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jury turning to the presumption only if the evidence of guilt was
weak (and who found the evidence in Johnson very strong,178) would
have found the instruction to be at worst harmless error.179 But,
since they could not be sure that the jury acted as they hypothesized,
the dissenters' position amounts to an argument that all that is es-
sential is that the decision formally be made by the jury. 180
With regard to the specific issues raised in these cases, the posi-
tion of the dissenters in Franklin and the majority in Clark seems
intuitively more plausible: minor changes in the wording of instruc-
tions probably do not have much effect on the outcome of the trial.
On the broader question ofjury independence, most of the Justices
expressed concern,' 8 ' but none of their approaches provides signifi-
cant protection. The Clark majority is satisfied so long as the trial is
structured to make the jury the official decision-maker, without re-
gard for the actual progress of the trial. 182 The Clark dissenters at-
tach importance to the dynamics of the judge-jury relationship,1 83
but their emphasis on the formal structure of instructions continues
the pattern of and shares the problems of New York v. Patterson 184
178 Id. at 99-101.
179 See Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere & Johnson, Evaluating the Preudicial Effect of Evi-
dence: Can Judges Idntify the Impact of Improper Evidence on Juries?, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1147,
1177-91, for a discussion of their research indicating thatjudges cannot discern whether
juries believe that evidence is prejudicial. They conclude that, given the inability of
judges to say either how a particular or an average jury would respond to erroneously
admitted evidence, the conviction should be affirmed only if the evidence is so persua-
sive that any reasonable jury would have been persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 1176-92. This harmless error test gives great weight to the right to trial by jury
without recognizing an entitlement to the possibility of an irrational acquittal.
180 An even rougher version of this theory is expressed by Justice Burger, concurring
in Ulster County Court v. Allen:
In the necessarily detailed step by step analysis of the legal issues, the central and
controlling facts of a case often can become lost. The "underbrush" of finely tuned
legal analysis of complex issues tends to bury the facts.
On this record, the jury could readily have reached, the same result without
benefit of the challenged statutory presumption ....
Ulster Court County, 442 U.S. at 167(Burger, J., concurring).
181 In Clark, Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, did not even identify jury
independence as a value at stake. 106 S. Ct. at 3112 (Stevens, J., concurring).
182 They said,
In many cases, the predicate facts conclusively establish intent, so that no rational
jury could find that the defendant committed the relevant criminal act but did not
intend to cause injury. (citations omitted) In that event the erroneous instruction is
simply superfluous: thejury has found, in Winship's words, "every fact necessary" to
establish every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 3108 (citations omitted).
183 The dissent began by asserting that the majority "disregarded totally" the defend-
ant's right to have ajury determine guilt or innocence. 106 S. Ct. at 3113 (Blackmun,J.,
dissenting).
184 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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and Sandstrom v. Montana.18 5
To determine whether a judge has intruded too far into the
jury's domain, the likely effect of the judge's words in the context of
the evidence must be examined. This same issue is raised by judicial
comments on the evidence, as most recent commentators have
recognized. 186
2. The Consequences of Turning Instructed Inferences into Comments on
the Evidence
An analysis of how the judge should communicate with the jury
is a vehicle for discussing the fundamental issue of the relative deci-
sion-making power of the judge and the jury. 8 7 Therefore, courts
sometimes examine such communications with great care and evalu-
ate them against strict standards. At the same time, courts are reluc-
tant to reverse convictions because of an erroneous jury instruction,
especially where the evidence of guilt is strong. When the trial
judge guides the jury's deliberations by suggesting that it should
draw certain conclusions from circumstantial evidence, the dilemma
posed by these propositions is particularly obvious.
On the one hand, any type of jury instruction infringes on the
jury's independence,1 8 8 limiting its role as the finder of fact and, of
particular importance in criminal cases, as the decider of the ulti-
mate issue-guilt or innocence. On the other hand, the jury loses
its legitimacy if its decision-making is too idiosyncratic. Debates
earlier in this century about the desirability of permitting judges to
comment on the evidence framed the issue as a conflict between the
democratic ideal ofjurors as citizen judges and the specter of unin-
telligent, naive jurors misled by wily lawyers.18 9
The practicalities of the situation are also very important. The
185 442 U.S. 510 (1979). See discussion supra text accompanying notes 117-18, 149-
55.
186 See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 194 & 195.
187 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 7-14.
188 Extreme emphasis on jury independence led to the notion accepted in the nine-
teenth century that the jury was the judge of law as well as fact. See sources cited supra
notes 7-8.
189 Johnson, Province of the Judge injury Trials, 12J. AM. JUD. Soc'v. 76 (1928); Sunder-
land, The Inefficiency of the AmericanJury, 13 MIcH. L. REV. 302 (1915). Cf. Holmes, Law in
Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 458-59 (1899).
McCormick advocated instructingjuries on presumptions because "[p]ersons unac-
customed to weighing evidence and particularly persons of limited intelligence are noto-
riously suspicious of circumstantial evidence." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at 668.
The deprecation ofjuries continues today. See, e.g., I J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra
note 7, at 107-56, 107-58.
Other reasons for desiring judicial control are suspicion of lawyers' tricks and a
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defense has available to it several mechanisms that protect against
convictions based on insufficient evidence. Similar mechanisms are
not available to insure against unfounded acquittals. Thejudge can
direct a verdict in favor of the defense but not the prosecution. The
defense may challenge on appeal any erroneous rulings that favor
the prosecution; the prosecution traditionally has been unable to
make such appeals, and today the prosecution still cannot challenge
a jury's acquittal on the basis that the decision was against the
weight of the evidence.190 Judicial admonitions that incline the jury
toward conviction-such as comments on the evidence, instructed
inferences, and, in an earlier day, presumption instructions-have
been one of the relatively few devices available to protect against a
jury's leniency.'19
Standardized instructions and ad hoc comments each have their
advantages. Standardization reduces the risk of error and minimizes
appellate review because it permits prior approval of language that
can be transported from case to case.' 92 On the other hand, empiri-
cal research suggests that a comment tailored to the facts of the case
is more likely to be understood and therefore followed.' 93 Further-
more, contemporary commentators criticize standardized jury in-
structions about inferences for their effect on the balance of
decision-making power between judge and jury. These commenta-
tors claim that such an instruction promotes jury irrationality by en-
couraging jurors to reach a conclusion without giving them an
independent basis for judging the conclusion's validity.' 94 These
desire to further bolster the law as a special area of learning that only the initiated can
understand and manipulate successfully. Id. at 107-49, 107-57.
The debate over the allocation of power between judge and jury also appears in the
question of whether standards of liability should be expressed as rules that judges apply
or as fact questions left to the jury. It is also reflected in appellate courts' inconsistent
treatment of inaccurate instructions. Sometimes the judge's every word is treated as
critical; at other times great imprecision is tolerated.
190 On the constitutionality of prosecution appeals, see C. WHrrEBREAD, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 500-01 (1980); Comment, Double Jeopardy and Appeal of Dismissal.s: A Before-
and-AfterApproach, 69 CAL. L. REV. 863 (1981).
191 On occasion people openly admitted that this was their concern. See, e.g.,Johnson,
supra note 189, at 81 (quoting a South Carolina judge who characterized a constitutional
prohibition of comments on the evidence as a deliberate design on the part of two or
three able criminal lawyers in the Constitutional Convention to prevent verdicts of guilty
in criminal cases).
192 See sources cited supra note 12 and accompanying text. Several states abolished
judicial comments because of the demonstrated excesses of a particular judge, a re-
sponse criticized by the commentators, but one that is not entirely irrational. SeeJohn-
son, supra note 189, at 81; Sunderland, supra note 189, at 309.
193 Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69 CAL. L. REV. 731
(1981); Severance & Loftus, supra note 10.
194 Allen, supra note 6, at 336-37, 353; Lushing, Faces Without Features: The Surace Va-
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commentators commonly propose to use individualized comments
on the evidence instead of standardized instructions.19 5
Despite repeated calls from the academic community for a
greater use ofjudicial comments on the evidence, 196 however, most
states still forbid or severely restrict their use. 197 Standardized pre-
sumption and inference instructions have been much more widely
used. Sandstrom forbids instructions expressed as presumptions, but
it does not ban standardized inference instructions.19 8 However,
Ulster County Court precludes inference instructions except when they
express a conclusion that the evidence actually presented sup-
ports. 199 As a practical matter then, instructed inferences are func-
lidity of Criminal Inferences, 72J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 82, 108-17 (1982); Nesson, supra
note 160, at 1205-08, 1215-22; Saltzburg, supra note 62, at 418-19; Schmolesky, County
Court of Ulster County v. Allen and Sandstrom v. Montana- The Supreme Court Lends an
Ear but Turns Its Face, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 261, 295 (1981); Sheldon, supra note 117, at
288-89.
In a later article, Professor Ronald Allen linked the rationality of the decision-mak-
ing process to the accuracy of result by acknowledging the indeterminacy of past facts
and substituting for accuracy a rational process, one that a wise person would use in an
effort to make the most likely reconstruction of the past. Allen, Rationality andAccuracy in
the Criminal Process: A Discordant Note on the Harmonizing of the Justices' Views on Burdens of
Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 74 J. CRIM. LAw & CRIMINOLOGY 1147, 1152-53 (1983).
195 Professor Allen has asserted that the principal evil of instructions on presumptions
is that they, like affirmative defenses, de facto shift the relative burden of persuasion to
the defendant. Allen, supra note 6, at 332-38. However, he has expressed approval of
accurate comments on the evidence even though they also encourage the jury to find
against the defendant and so effectively lessen the prosecution's burden of persuasion.
Id. at 348-53. He reconciled these propositions by arguing that the burdens of proof are
reciprocal-when the prosecution has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
the defendant has the burden of raising a reasonable doubt. Therefore, if a device
merely requires the defendant to raise a reasonable doubt, it is not inconsistent with the
prosecution's constitutional burden of proof. Thus, an accurate comment is permissible
because it only requires the defendant to raise a reasonable doubt, while the inaccurate
comment is forbidden because it increases the defendant's burden beyond showing that
there is a reasonable doubt of guilt. Id. at 349.
Professor Charles Nesson has argued that presumptions threaten the perceived va-
lidity of a jury verdict, which is essential to the legitimacy of the criminal justice system
by making it possible to second-guess the jury's findings. Specifically, a generalized pre-
sumption jury instruction isolates and identifies one reasoning avenue the jury might
have followed, which reduces the case to a simplified assessment of the chances of guilt.
This is inconsistent with the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To avoid this,
he says that such instructions should be replaced by accurate, individualized comments
on the evidence. Nesson, supra note 160, at 1222-25; Nesson, supra note 118.
See also United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1979), in which the Court said that the
right to jury trial would be compromised if the jury were permitted by an instruction to
acquit the defendant on an affirmative defense for which there was insufficient evidence.
196 See, e.g., Wright, The Invasion ofJivy: Temperature of the War, 27 TEMPLE L.Q. 137,
140-41 (1953).
' 97 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 7, at 107[01] n. 15.
198 See supra text accompanying notes 113-16.
199 See supra text accompanying notes 126-129.
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tionally equivalent to comments on the evidence. Therefore, states
that forbid comments must either reconsider their position or lose
this means of controlling the jury. As might be expected, courts in
several recent cases have been reluctant to accept the equation of
presumption instructions with instructed -inferences with comments
on the evidence. Other courts, though, have adopted this line of
reasoning and its implications.
At one extreme is Delaware, which permits comments on the
evidence.200 In Hall v. State,20 1 the Delaware Supreme Court said
that presumptions must be permissible but that they "explain the
legal significance which the law attaches to a particular factual find-
ing," a statement which is quite inconsistent with the first proposi-
tion. The position taken by the California Supreme Court in People
v. Roder 20 2 is more coherent. The court there said that inference
instructions are the equivalent of comments. Since California per-
mits comments on the evidence, 20 3 the court saw no reason to for-
bid instructed inferences. It said:
[P]reservation of the statutory provisions [creating a presumption] in a
restrained form will still enable the court to inform the jury of an infer-
ence which the Legislature--drawing on its general experience-has
concluded can often reasonably be drawn from proof of the basic facts
(citations omitted); elimination of the device would deprive the jury of
any legislative guidance in circumstances in which direct evidence of
actual guilty knowledge will rarely be available. 20 4
The Supreme Court of Oregon, a state in which comments on
the evidence are forbidden,20 5 has carefully and correctly analyzed
the effect of converting presumptions into inferences. In State v.
Rainey 206 the jury was instructed about a statutory presumption as if
it were a permissible inference. The Oregon Supreme Court held
that the instruction was the legal equivalent of a forbidden comment
on the evidence, requiring reversal of the defendant's conviction.
Henceforth, the court said, judges should not tell the jury about
statutory presumptions, even in permissive terms. It said:
200 j. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 7, at 107[01] n.15.
201 473 A.2d 352, 356 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984). See also State v. Carlisle, 458 So. 2d
1347 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
202 33 Cal. 3d 491, 658 P.2d 1302, 189 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1983).
203 j. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 7, at 107[01], n.15.
204 33 Cal. 3d at 508, 658 P.2d at 1313, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
205 Oregon R. Civ. P. 59 E.
206 298 Or. 459, 693 P.2d 635 (1984). The court said its decision was not based on
federal due process. However, it cited Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) and
Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979), as well as the Oregon Rules of Evi-
dence and the leading scholar on Oregon evidence law, who says that the rules corre-
spond with the federal constitutional cases. 298 Or. at 465-66, 693 P.2d at 639-40.
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It is the task of the advocate, not the judge, to comment on inferences.
The advocate must do so without reference to any statute, but merely
from the evidence in the case. Inferences when used against the de-
fendant should be left to argument without any instructions ....
Therefore, all a statutory inference does in a criminal case when used
against the accused on an element of the crime is to focus the trial
court's attention on a potentially available inference that, subject to
satisfying the foregoing tests, may entitle the case to go to the jury and
to provide the prosecutor with a theoretical basis for an argument for
the jury.2 0 7
Citing Ulster County Court, the court in dicta also said that a stat-
utory presumption will not save the prosecution from a directed ver-
dict if the evidence actually presented at trial is otherwise
insufficient, unless the inferred fact follows from the proven fact be-
yond a reasonable doubt.20 8
Standardized inference instructions seem more attractive than
comments on the evidence, whose propriety cannot be determined
without assessing the specific setting in which they are given.20 9
Under Ulster County Court v. Allen,2 10 though, the jury may be told
about a statutory presumption in the form of an instructed inference
only if the evidence actually presented at the trial supports the infer-
ence. Therefore, states which cling to standardized instructions do
not escape a review of these instructions dependent on the facts of
each case, though these states preserve the advantage of routinized
language.2 "l
The changes of the 1970s and 1980s in the law of burdens of
proof and presumptions in criminal cases have substantially limited
legislative authority to declare that proof of one fact satisfies the
prosecution's burden of production and have eliminated the use of
presumptions to shift the burden of persuasion. However, the legis-
lature's ultimate authority to allocate the burden of persuasion be-
tween the prosecution and the defense is still intact. In terms of the
values that the Court has said are essential to fairness-proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt and jury fact-finding-the cases do en-
hance the authority of the jury, as opposed to the legislature, to find
the facts. These cases have not, however, significantly limited the
207 Id. at 467-68, 693 P.2d at 640. Cf Sims v. State, 482 N.E.2d 1182 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985); Aguilar v. State, 682 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Roberts v. State, 672
S.W.2d 570, 577-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
208 298 Or. at 467, 693 P.2d at 640.
209 SeeJ. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 7, at 107[17], 107[18].
210 442 U.S. 140 (1979). See supra text accompanying notes 126-29.
211 See supra text accompanying notes 194-95 for a discussion of the claim made by
recent commentators that abstract, standardized inference instructions promote irra-
tional decision-making and so should be banned.
[Vol. 77350
LIMITS ON CRIMINAL PRESUMPTIONS
practical ability of the judge to influence the conclusions the jury
draws from circumstantial evidence.
IV. THE SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE OF PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT AND JURY INDEPENDENCE
The recent cases regarding presumptions, inferences and the
burdens of proof provide weak protection for the values that the
Supreme Court says are at stake. Furthermore, though complex and
interesting, the constitutional law of presumptions and inferences
has always had comparatively little direct effect on how the criminal
justice system operates. Most cases that go to trial hinge on issues
other than presumptions, for example, the propriety of some police
investigatory tactic and the consequent admissibility of evidence.
Moreover, the great majority of cases do not even go to trial but are
resolved by a guilty plea following bargaining between the law-
yers.212 Other factors, such as the scope of recidivist statutes,213 the
possibility of excluding illegally obtained evidence 214 and the law of
plea bargaining itself,215 are generally more important to criminal
212 An estimated ninety percent of all criminal convictions in the United States are by
guilty pleas. Cramer, Rossman & McDonald, The Judicial Role in Plea-Bargaining, in PLEA
BARGAINING 139, 139 (1980), cited in Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right
to Trial. Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CmI. L. REV. 931, 935 n.36 (1983).
Professor Friedman has traced the prevalence of plea bargaining to the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Its rise coincides with the ascendance of professional po-
lice and prosecutors and the attendant shift from an adjudicative to a more administra-
tive system. L. FRIEDMAN & R. PERCIVAL, supra note 11, at 173-94; Friedman, Plea
Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 247 (1979). See also Haller, Plea
Bargaining: The Nineteenth Century Context, 13 LAw & Soc'v REV. 273 (1979).
213 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). The Supreme Court has upheld
application of recidivist statutes in all but the most outrageous cases. See Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277 (1983); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263 (1980).
214 See, e.g., Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1971); McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759 (1970)(guilty pleas induced in part by erroneous belief that coerced con-
fessions would be admissible upheld against defendant because defendant advised by
counsel); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)(guilty plea valid because defend-
ant assisted by counsel, even though statute subjected defendant who went to trial to
possiblity of death penalty, and statute held unconstitutional between plea and appeal).
Recent erosion of limits on police investigative tactics may have increased the prosecu-
tor's bargaining leverage.
215 The Supreme Court has mandated formal guarantees of a fair plea process. See
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238
(1969)(record must establish knowing waiver of constitutional rights relinquished by
pleading guilty); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. See also White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963);
Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948)(right to counsel); McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759 (1970)(counsel must be competent). But see Hill v. Lockhart, 439 U.S. 212
(1985)(to satisfy prejudice requirement of ineffective assistance of counsel claim, de-
fendant must show that there was a reasonable probability that he would not have
pleaded guilty had counsel not made errors). The Court has, however, refused to har-
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cases than the application of statutory presumptions. The major
significance of cases and commentary about constitutional limits on
presumptions, inferences and the process of proof is their contribu-
tion to the philosophical environment of the criminal justice system.
As demonstrated, over the years the constitutional law of presump-
tions has reflected and helped shape the changing concept of what
fundamental fairness means.
For the last fifteen years, as in the 1920s and 1930s, great rhe-
torical emphasis has been placed on fact-finding accuracy. Though
most often invoked today to justify a restriction of pretrial protec-
tions for criminal defendants, 216 this rhetoric has produced deci-
sions favorable to defendants. Among them are the cases about
presumptions and burdens of proof discussed here-Mullaney, Pat-
terson, Ulster County Court and Sandstrom. Others include In Re Win-
ship,217 which held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
constitutionally required, Taylor v. Kentucky, 218 which concluded that
under certain circumstances due process requires that the jury be
instructed on the presumption of innocence, and Jackson v. Vir-
ginia,219 which strengthened the constitutional test for sufficiency of
the evidence. In a sense, some of these requirements, such as those
associated with proof beyond a reasonable doubt, distort fact-find-
ing accuracy by mandating acquittal when the defendant may be fac-
tually guilty. In In re Winship the Supreme Court justified this result
in terms of the symbolic meaning of the burden of persuasion. It
said:
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital
ness structural features that tend to deprive the defendant of any real choice other than
to accept the bargain offered. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978)(plea of
guilty valid though induced by prosecutor's statement that if defendant did not accept
plea offered, prosecutor would seek to indict defendant under recidivist statute that car-
ried mandatory penalty of life imprisonment); Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212,
(1978) (guilty plea valid even though statute encouraged pleas of guilty by providing that
sentence of life in prison mandatory if defendant convicted by jury but lesser term of 30
years possible if defendant pled guilty to same offense); Parker v. North Carolina, 397
U.S. 790 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)(discussed supra note 214).
216 See, e.g., Ashdown, Good Faith, The Exclusionary Remedy, and Rule-Oriented Adjudication
in the Criminal Process, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 335 (1983); Burkoff, The Court that Devoured
the Fourth Amendment: The Triumph of an Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 ORE. L. REV.
151 (1979); Whitebread, The Burger Court's Counterrevolution in Criminal Procedure: The Re-
cent Criminal Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 24 WASHBURN L. REV. 471 (1985).
But see Seidman, supra note 80.
217 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
218 436 U.S. 478 (1978). But see Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979).
219 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Jackson is also notable for its extension of this test to federal
habeas corpus review of state convictions at a time when the scope of review in other
areas was being restricted. See Brilmayer, State Forfeiture Rules and Federal Review of State
Criminal Convictions, 49 U. CHi. L. REV. 741 (1982).
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role in our criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused dur-
ing a criminal prosecution has at stake interest of immense impor-
tance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon
conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized
by the conviction. Accordingly, a society that values the good name
and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for com-
mission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt ....
Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to
command the respect and confidence of the community in applications
of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law
not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt
whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in
our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs
have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a
criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt
with utmost certainty.220
The emphasis of Ulster County Court and Sandstrom on the jury's
role as an independent fact-finder invokes a similar powerful sym-
bol. Giving ultimate power to assess guilt to a group of independ-
ent citizens offers further assurance that only factually guilty
defendants will be convicted.221
Today's focus on factual guilt and innocence, however, differs
in an important way from the focus of the 1930s. The concern in
the 1930s marked the dawn of the constitutional taming of the crim-
inal justice system. In contrast, for the last decade and a half treat-
ment of persons accused of crime has been growing harsher. Today
assurance that defendants are in fact guilty is important because it
makes this harshness more palatable.
Increasingly punitive attitudes toward criminals appear
throughout the criminal justice system. The movement from inde-
terminate to determinate sentencing is premised philosophically on
the rejection of rehabilitation as a justification for punishment and
the acceptance instead of retribution, deterrence or incapacitation
to justify punishment. 222 While some who advocated this change
perceived that the implementation of the rehabilitative ideal was de-
220 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970). See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
(1982)(clear and convincing evidence required to terminate parental rights); Addington
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)(clear and convincing evidence required for civil commit-
ment proceedings).
221 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-58 (1968); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528, 554-55 (1971)(Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). See also Schultz,
The Juy Redefined: A Review of Burger Court Decisions, 43 LAw & CONtEMP. PROB. No. 4, 8
(1980)(concluding that retrenchment on several issues has weakened the jury's func-
tional utility).
222 See, e.g., Blackmore & Welsh, Selective Incapacitation: Sentencing According to Risk, 29
CRIME & DELIN. 504 (1983); Cavender & Musheno, The Adoption and Implementation of
Determinate-Based Sanctioning Policies: A Critical Perspective, 17 GA. L. REV. 425 (1983); Gal-
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humanizing, 223 much of the current rhetoric in support of the
change is punitive. 224 Reformers call for changes in the juvenile jus-
tice system to make it more like the adult system; they believe it
mollycoddles delinquents who are as or more dangerous than their
adult counterparts.225 Professional organizations propose to re-
strict the scope of the insanity defense, 226 and some states have even
eliminated it.227 The acceptability and use of the death penalty has
increased. 228 Erosion of constitutional limitations on police investi-
vin, Prison Policy Reform Ten Years Later, 29 CRIME & DELIN. 495 (1983). But see Von
Hirsch, Book Review, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 819 (1983).
223 See, e.g. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE-A RE-
PORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 34-47 (1971).
224 Numerous politicans have made such statements for popular consumption. In the
professional literature hysterical statements are rare. Scholars tend to speak in terms of
protecting society effectively and just desserts. See, e.g., P. GREENWOOD, SELECTIVE INCA-
PACITATION (1982); N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); A. VON HIRSCH,
DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976); J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT
CRIME, PART III (2d ed. 1983).
225 See, e.g., Schuster, Violent Juveniles and Proposed Changes in Juvenile Justice: A Case of
Overkill?, 33 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. No. 4 37 (Nov. 1982)(citing e.g., No More Kid Gloves for
Young Hoodlums, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT Mar. 5, 1979 at 24; Treating Kids Like Adults,
NEWSWEEK, April 16, 1979 at 54; Wolfgang, Abolish the Juvenile Court System, No. 10 Calif.
Lawyer 12 (Nov. 1982); U.S. Dept. Justice, Office of Juv. Justice & Delin. Prev., The
Young Criminal Years of the Violent Few (1985)). See also C. SILBERMAN, supra note 34,
at ch. 9.
226 American Psychiatric Ass'n, Statement on the Insanity Defense, Dec. 1982, 140 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 6 (1983); MODEL INSANITY DEFENSE AND POST-TRIAL DISPOSITION ACT 201
(Nat'l Conf. of Comm. on Uniform State Laws 1984); CRIMINALJUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH
STANDARDS 7-6.1 (1984) (approved 1985).
227 Idaho Code Ann. § 18.207 (Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 46, § 14-102
(1985).
228 During the mid-1960s about half the population favored the death penalty. Since
the late 1960s a majority of more than two to one has supported it. H. BEDAU, THE
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 65 (3d ed. 1982)(ch. 3 surveys literature on public opinion).
The Supreme Court has moved since 1972 from uncertainty about the constitutionality
of any death penalty scheme, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 239 (1972); to validation of at
least some death penalty schemes, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); to approval of
an accelerated appeals process in capital cases, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
Since 1977, the year of the first execution after Furman, both the numbers of people on
death row and of people executed has risen substantially.
Persons Under Persons









Sources: U.S. DEPT. COMMERCE, CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1981 192-93; STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1986 188-89.
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gative practices has been justified because the objects of the
searches and interrogations turn out to have violated the law. 229 In
a 1984 opinion rejecting a prisoner's claim to compensation for a
guard's intentional destruction of his property during a shakedown
search, the Supreme Court even rejected the notion that one of the
basic aspects of respect for human dignity extends to persons im-
prisoned for crime. 230 It said, "[S]ociety is not prepared to recog-
nize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a
prisoner might have in his prison cell and that, accordingly, the
fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does
not apply within the confines of the prison cell." 23 1
Some of these changes have little direct effect on the criminal
justice system's operation. Relatively few people assert the insanity
defense 23 2 or are subject to the death penalty.233 Empirical studies
suggest that fourth amendment limits on searches and seizures and
Miranda warnings may not really prevent the conviction of many
people. 234 The studies do, however, show that such rules induce
police to avoid illegal searches and stimulate police training pro-
grams. 23 5 All of these rules help to shape expectations about the
relationship between individuals and agents of the state, which af-
fects how the mass of criminal defendants are treated. So too the
change in the tone of constitutional criminal procedure decisions
reflects and helps to validate thinking about criminals as not entitled
to the respect that government affords other citizens.23 6 To make
229 See sources cited supra note 216.
230 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
231 Id. at 525-26.
232 The insanity defense is successfully invoked in less than one percent of all felony
cases. American Psychiatric Ass'n., ISSUES IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 10 (1984)(citing
Pasewark, Insanity Plea: A Review of the Research Literature, 9 J. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 357
(1981)); Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, House Comm. on the Judiciary (1982)(Testi-
mony ofHJ. Steadman). 97th Cong., 1st Session.
233 For example, in 1978, 19,555 people in the United States were murdered. In the
same year no one was executed, 183 received the death sentence, and at year-end 445
were under sentence of death. In 1979 two persons were executed and 159 were added
to the death-row population, which totaled 567 at year-end. H. BEDAU, supra note 228,
at 51, 56, 63 (charts collecting data from FBI Uniform Crime Reports, Monthly Vital
Statistics Report, National Prisoner Statistics, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin on
Capital Punishment, and NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund).
In 1983, 18,593 murders and nonnegligent manslaughters were reported to the po-
lice. FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE 146, 147 (1983). In the
same year five persons were executed and 1,202 were under sentence of death. BUREAU
OFJUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, U.S. DEP'TJUSTICE 1, 3 (1983).
234 See Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual Constitutional
Rights, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1, 9-10 nn.27 & 31 (1985)(collecting empirical studies).
235 Id. at 30-33 (collecting studies).
236 Near the height of the Warren Court era, Professor Griffiths wrote that the new
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this attitude acceptable, though, people must be assured that per-
sons convicted of crimes are in fact guilty.
The constitutionalization of the proof beyond a reasonable
doubt requirement is part of the effort to provide this assurance.
The general population, however, has no reason to know about the
intricacies of burdens of proof, presumptions and jury instructions.
Thus, decisions about these topics do not directly affect public per-
ception of the criminal justice system.
Ostensibly many of the changes discussed in this paper are
designed to prevent judges from making statements to the jury that
are coercive or incoherent. Whether a jury would perceive an ab-
stract instruction as incoherent, or an instruction that begins "You
may infer" as substantially less coercive than one beginning, "The
law presumes," is, however, doubtful. Even if the jury considers an
instruction incomprehensible or obligatory, its members may not be
bothered. If they are bothered, they constitute a small portion of
the population and are not likely to spread the word to the general
populace. Nor is the public likely to become aware of the issue
through some other means. 237
The people who know and care about the niceties of the bur-
dens of proof, presumptions, inferences and jury instructions are
lawyers. Socialized to believe in process as much as results, lawyers
need more than an appellate court's finding that the evidence is suf-
ficient to feel that a criminal defendant has been treated fairly. Con-
sideration of these topics serves a useful purpose when it facilitates
exploration of issues central to the criminal justice system, such as
how to divide power between judges and juries and what the con-
tent of the criminal law should be. But to the extent that this discus-
sion turns away from fundamental issues toward ritual affirmation of
constitutional limits on criminal procedure were largely irrelevant to how the system
actually operated and served merely to explain, excuse and justify it. Griffiths, supra
note 34, at 415-16. The cases did more than this though; they also created new expecta-
tions about the relationship between criminals and society which are themselves under
attack now.
237 Another argument tying limits on presumptions to legitimacy is that statutory pre-
sumptions obscure what the legislature is doing. Ashford & Risinger, supra note 15, at
178; Underwood, supra note 118, at 1320-23. However, the public probably does not
know the exact content of criminal statutes, though there may be general assumptions
that, for example, a person who possesses stolen property but does not know that it is
stolen is not guilty of a crime. But the question raised by this view of presumption
statutes is whether people would perceive a difference, and further, an unfair difference,
between a statute prohibiting knowing possession of stolen property with a presumption
of knowledge if the goods were stolen recently and a statute with the same elements but
without the presumption.
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factual guilt, it is harmful, for it diverts energy from and provides an
excuse for neglecting the host of other issues that really matter.
